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Technological advances, increased energy demand, and
political events have coalesced in recent years to make the
extraction of hydrocarbon energy resources in the arctic
attractive. U. S. efforts in this direction have begun on
Alaska's North Slope and are poised to expand into offshore
areas. These developments could have, particularly in con-
junction with marine transportation, a dramatic impact on the
U. S. Coast Guard and especially its icebreaking mission.
Evaluation of this impact is approached by a background
review of the Coast Guard's icebreaking role, and historical
development in Alaska; and by evaluation of five issues which
seem to be primary determinants of the relevant future.
These include (1) energy development; (2) energy-related
transportation; (3) concerns for the natural and social
environment; (4) Canadian arctic developments; and (5) the
international perspective. Trends in these five issue areas
are then integrated to formulate a projection of future Coast
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The arctic, long a domain reserved for the natural world
and a scattering of awesomely-adaptive aboriginal people, now
faces the assault of rational man and the effects of his
civilization. It is quickly becoming a part of the "real"
political and economic world. The process began several
centuries ago and is in many ways analogous to the quest for
treasure that lured colonizing Europeans to the far corners
of world. Hydrocarbon energy is the arctic's principal
treasure; and technology, the economics of demand and politi-
cal events in an increasingly interdependent world have
converged to make it irresistible. The region's inhospital-
ity is no longer an adequate defense. One of the last
frontiers is yielding.
But the arctic may be conquered in a different way.
There is a new and powerful concern for the untrammelled
environment, and especially so in Alaska. This counter-
vailing force to indiscriminate development was born about
the time that the Prudhoe Bay oil discoveries were announced
in 1968, and had an important effect on shaping that first
episode of resource development. Environmental concern will
probably have a significant role in shaping the course of
future events as well.
What happens in arctic Alaska will have significant
impact throughout American society, from the residents of

that unique state to the consumers and end-users of petroleum
products. There will also be important consequences for gov-
ernmental agencies. The U. S. Coast Guard has particular
res- ponsibilities for marine transportation, and has
accumulated extensive organizational expertise in ice-covered
waters.
Icebreaking is both old and new. Men have navigated
gingerly through ice-strewn waters for centuries; somewhat
more recently they began strengthening their ships to with-
stand the forces of ice. The modern icebreaker, however,
developed only in this century and has made access to the
polar frontiers relatively routine. Icebreaking capability,
by making arctic marine transportation feasible, is one of
the technological factors which enables arctic development.
Similarly, development of natural resources in arctic Alaska,
however it ultimately unfolds, will inevitably make demands
on the Coast Guard's icebreaking responsibilities.
The long lead time in planning for adequate icebreaking
resources requires a view forward. By examining the past and
events now in motion, it may be possible to glimpse the shape
of future requirements. More usefully, perhaps, issues can
be clarified and areas for policy decisions can be accent-
uated. Looking into the future and attempting to identify
what may be there is a hazardous undertaking. But not
looking ahead, toward the inevitable changes, probably
involves even more risk.

I. BACKGROUND; ICEBREAKING AND THE COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard is in certain ways unique in the
country v s governmental structure. It is, by definition, an
armed force of the United States yet virtually the entire
thrust of its peacetime role is distinctly non-military.
This dual nature is characteristic of individual operating
units as well as the organization as a whole. The sheer
scope of duties is also noteworthy; there are fourteen
operating programs (or major endeavors) carried out by 38,400
uniformed personnel, 5,400 civilian employees, 11,700
selected reservists and an auxiliary of 42,500 [Reference
160]
.
The Coast Guard has been descriptively categorized
with regard to these features as a dual-role, multi-mission
agency: it is a military service performing a wide range of
civilian duties [Ref . 2]
.
A. OBJECTIVES AND OPERATING PROGRAMS OF THE COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard v s purpose as an organization stems from
seven formal objectives (designated by letters) . The
operating programs are defined in terms of specific action
and resource allocation plans designed to achieve the
objectives. Formal objectives are as follows:
—Objective A - to minimize loss of life, personal
injury, and property damage on, over and under the high seas
and waters subject to U. S. jurisdiction.

—Objective B to facilitate transportation with
particular emphasis on waterborne activity in support of
national economic, defense and social needs.
—Objective C - to maintain an effective, ready armed
force prepared for and immediately responsive to specific
tasks in time of war or emergency.
—Objective D - to assure the safety and security of
vessels and of ports and waterways and their related
shoreside facilities.
—Objective E - to enforce federal laws and international
agreements on and under waters subject to the jurisdiction of
the U. S. and under the high seas where authorized.
—Objective F - to maintain or improve the quality of the
marine environment.
—Objective G - to cooperate with other governmental
agencies and entities (federal, state and local) to assure
efficient utilization of public resources, and to carry out
activities in the international sphere where appropriate in
furthering national policy.
The single factor which most nearly embraces the Coast
Guard's multitudinous responsibilities is involvement with
the sea and maritime affairs. This especially applies to
inland waters and coastal areas, but modern responsibilities
also encompass large ocean expanses as well. A slightly more
restrictive generalization is the service's involvement with
marine transportation, which is reflected by its position in
the Department of Transportation. The maritime orientation
with a transportation focus is part of a historic legacy,
dating from Alexander Hamilton's creation of the Revenue
Marine in 1790; prior to 1967 the Coast Guard was part of the
Treasury Department, reflecting its origin as a revenue
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ninety-one years of organizational mergers and acquisition
(in some cases, imposition) of new tasks has evolved into
today's Coast Guard. The fourteen operating programs that
execute the broad responsibilities of the organization are
briefly described below.
1. Short-Range Aids To Navigation and Radionavigation
Aids (ATON)
Facilitation of safe and expeditious passage of
marine traffic is the purpose of a system of over 47,000
buoys, lights, radio beacons and daymarks, and numerous Loran
and Omega stations which provide far-reaching continuous




Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT)
Protection and preservation of natural resources and
national interests in U. S. territorial and adjacent waters
is one of the oldest functions but is particularly
significant since the country established a 200-mile economic
management zone for its coastal waters. The program
encompasses surveillance of foreign fishing fleets,
suppression of smuggling and other illegal activities and
enforcement of environmental protection regulations [Ref.
38] .
3 Military Preparedness and Military Operations (MP/MO)
By law the Coast Guard must maintain itself as a
ready, effective armed force, prepared for specific tasks in
time of war or national emergency. Coast Guard units operate
12

with the Navy to train and support some naval operations.
The service is transferred to the Navy Department at the
direction of the President for wartime utilization [Ref . 38]
.
4. Commercial Vessel Safety (CVS)
In order to prevent injury and death, property loss,
and environmental damage, the Coast Guard administers
regulations governing commercial vessels and oil rigs.
Safety standards are implemented through vessel and equipment
inspection, vessel documentation, licensing of seamen and
investigation of accidents and violations [Ref. 38]
.
5. Search and Rescue (SAR)
Perhaps the most glamorous of the operating programs,
the assistance of persons and property in distress extends to
U. S. jurisdictional waters, the Caribbean Sea, and most of
the North Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans. An estimated
4300 lives and $268 million in property were saved in 1973
[Ref. 38].
6. Recreational Boating Safety (RBS)
This program seeks to minimize the loss of life and
property associated with recreational boating. Safety
patrols are conducted, liaison with state and local agencies
is maintained, equipment is approved for manufacture, and
educational programs for the boater are promoted. The Coast
Guard Auxiliary, a volunteer organization sponsored by the






Domestic and Polar Icebreakinq (PI, PO)
These programs are discussed in subsequent sections
of this chapter.
8. Port Safety and Security (PSS)
To reduce the risk of marine accidents, the Coast
Guard monitors activity in ports and harbors and enforces a
variety of laws and safety regulations. This involves
supervision of vessels loading, carrying and discharging
hazardous cargoes, investigation of accidents and violations,
and managing traffic flows. The establishment of vessel
traffic systems is the newest development [Ref . 38]
.
9 Marine Science Activities (MSA)
Oceanographic and meteorological activities are
conducted to support national marine science objectives and
other Coast Guard programs. This includes data collection,
conducting the International Ice Patrol in the North Atlantic
and supporting scientific research efforts [Ref. 38].
10. Marine Environmental Protection (MEP)
In order to prevent and minimize damage to the
marine environment, the Coast Guard enforces laws and
regulations in this area, maintains surveillance of coastal
waters, administers a system of enforcement and maintains a
cleanup capability. Pollution by petroleum products is





11. Bridge Administration (BA)
Bridges crossing waterways are frequently
impediments to the passage of marine traffic. The Coast
Guard inspects bridges, issues permits to insure that marine
needs are met, promulgates regulations for drawbridges, and
supervises modifications to bridges creating undue
obstructions [Ref. 38].
12. Support Programs
Support of the operating programs is provided by
communications, public affairs, research and development,
personnel, civil rights, legal, engineering, fiscal and
supply, health care, and intelligence/security programs.
As key elements in an overall planning and budgetary
process, these programs are managed by program managers and
directors on the staff of the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
The programs are carried out by operating units in the field.
Figure 1-2 shows the basic organizational structure. The
Chief, Office of Operations is program director, and the head
of his Marine Science and Ice Operations Division is program
manager for the polar and domestic icebreaking programs.
This thesis will deal, for the most part, with the
icebreaking programs.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ICEBREAKING MISSION
The earliest applications of icebreaking in this country
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Philadelphia, New York and Boston sought to keep these ports
open for commerce. Paddle wheel ferryboats with "ram" bows
were used for the purpose. Also in response to the demands
of commerce, Great Lakes ferries began breaking ice in the
late 1880s with a high degree of success [Ref. 1]
.
The same time period saw the beginnings of American
interest in the polar regions. Sealers and whalers ventured
into these unknown areas from the earliest days of North
American settlement; Nathaniel Palmer discovered the
antarctic continent's Palmer Peninsula while sealing in 1820.
In 1838 Lieutenant Charles Wilkes led a six-ship U. S. Navy
expedition to the antarctic for research and exploration.
The arctic became a prime concern in 1867 with the purchase
of Alaska, and ice-strengthened revenue cutters were procured
for operation in Alaskan waters. Regular cruising in the
Arctic Ocean began in 1880, and a four-ship Bering Sea Patrol
Force was instituted in 1895. The legendary revenue cutter
BEAR was a fixture of Alaskan arctic and sub-arctic waters
for 41 years during this period.
Following the TITANIC disaster in 1912, the United States
established an ice patrol. This undertaking became an inter-
national one, and research efforts led to operations in the
eastern arctic and along the Greenland coast [Ref. 42]
.
Although technically not a precursor of modern icebreaking,
the Coast Guard gained extensive organizational expertise
which built on long involvement in the western arctic.
17

Admiral Richard E. Byrd's antarctic expeditions in the
1930s represented a continuation of U. S. interest in the
high southern latitudes. The BEAR, retired as a revenue
cutter, was Byrd's headquarters ship during his antarctic
exploits.
Domestic icebreaking was directly assigned to the Coast
Guard by Executive Order 7521 of December 21, 1936. It
directed the service to "assist in keeping open to navigation
by means of icebreaking operations . . . channels and harbors
within the reasonable demands of commerce" [Ref . 42] . This
was perhaps most significantly applicable on the Great Lakes
immediately prior to World War II, where the defense effort
led to the Coast Guard charter of ferries for icebreaking
operations. The MACKINAW was specifically constructed for
the Lakes to expedite movement of iron ore. A number of ice-
reinforced buoy tenders were also built during the war for
added ice capability on these inland waters.
The Second World War brought with it development of the
first deep-draft, modern American icebreakers, thanks largely
to the foresight of Admiral Russell R. Waesche, the Coast
Guard's wartime Commandant [Ref. 13] . A comprehensive review
of the icebreaking problem and state-of-the-art icebreaker
design in Europe had been undertaken in 1937, and from this
study, the venerable WIND-class design was developed [Ref.
13] . Seven of these ships were produced. EASTWIND was
commissioned in 1944 and saw service as a Coast Guard-manned
18

vessel, along with many others in Greenland during the war.
Three icebreakers of the class were transferred to the Soviet
Union for wartime use (although the ships were not returned
until 1951) . The final three were built at the end of the
war, with one assigned to the Coast Guard and two becoming
Navy vessels. STORIS, a smaller and less powerful ice-
capable ship, was built in 1942 for use in the Greenland-
Labrador arena [Ref . 42]
.
The WIND-class has served as an enduring prototype for
the "modern" icebreaker. It is characterized by a heavily
strengthened underwater hull (1 7/8 inches thick fore and
aft) , deep draft (29 feet) , large beam, a bow which slopes
aft and downward from the waterline, and ample power. An
icebreaker functions by steaming continuously through
relatively light ice, or backing and ramming in heavier
accumulations. In both cases the vessel uses its power and
weight to displace the ice; in backing and ramming the
icebreaker is driven up onto its sloping bow until the weight
of the vessel breaks the ice and shoves it to each side.
Although many refinements in bow design, propulsion systems
and sheer power and size have been made over the years, the
basic concepts built into the WIND-class have survived. It
is worthy of note that two of these ships are still in
service.
The post-war years brought expanded roles for the
expanded capabilities of the icebreakers. The massive
19

Operation Highjump (1946- 47) involved use of naval and air
support for scientific operations in Antarctica, and the Navy
and Coast Guard icebreakers played a central role.
Construction of arctic defense early warning (DEW-Line)
stations during the cold war years required icebreaker
support as well, mainly for logistic purposes. A number of
routine annual missions for the icebreaker fleet evolved.
In 1965 the Coast Guard became the sole proprietor of U.
S. icebreakers. A memorandum of agreement transferred all
five Navy icebreakers to the Coast Guard; the move reflected
the Navy's desire to utilize its personnel in combatant
vessels, and perceived advantages of centralizing management
of the resources. The agreement delineated that the ships
would retain their commitment to support naval operations,
including preparation for war in the high latitudes, and
would serve under Navy operational control when necessary.
The mission of the icebreakers was defined: "To ensure
passage of ships through ice fields and sea ice in support of
bases and operations in high latitudes." Eight more detailed
tasks were also specified, including ice reconnaissance,
scientific operations, logistic support, diving, salvage,
underwater repair and as a command platform [Ref . 173]
.
C. CURRENT POLAR INVOLVEMENT AND POLICY
As the icebreaking mission has developed, it has
traditionally been separated into domestic and polar modes
20

and, up until the present time, this division has been fairly
explicit. Differentiation of the two forms is focused, as
the terms imply, on their geographic application, but an
additional distinction has evolved. Both involve assistance
to "users" of icebreaking services. In domestic areas this
has generally meant commercial shipping, while high latitude
clients have been other governmental agencies and
institutions. This destinction has its basis in the fact
that the polar regions have traditionally been prime areas
for research and, until recently, were irrelevant for
commercial purposes.
1. Icebreaking at the Ends of the Earth
Requirements of user organizations have involved
logistic support, scientific research, assistance to vessels
in the ice and the contingent possibility of supporting
military (especially naval) operations. As Figure 1-3 shows,
some of these requirements have other objectives further
downstream. There are some minor functions generated solely
by Coast Guard missions, such as marine science, search and
rescue, and aids to navigation work, but the bulk of polar
icebreaking has been a response to the needs of client
organizations.
The contractual implication in a client-icebreaker
relationship is descriptive, because memoranda of agreement






























U Cfl uhx: m 3
iw o cu cnH S-i Wl •H
jj fd ft fa
c <u





of Management and Budget (OMB) , the National Science
Foundation (NSF) became responsible for directing the U. S.
Antarctic Program in 1971, and the Coast Guard effectively
became a "contractor" providing icebreaking services. The
contractual nature of the relationship was further
strengthened by Congressional direction in the fiscal year
1976 appropriation bill that polar icebreaking services for
major users (identified as NSF and the Department of Defense)
be provided on a reimbursable basis [Ref . 167] . Memoranda of
agreement with these agencies specify criteria for planning
and reimbursement [Refs. 170, 171].
In recurrent functional terms, polar icebreakers
—annually break a channel into Antarctica's
McMurdo Sound and assist the passage of a freighter and oiler
for provisioning the large U. S. station there.
—embark scientific parties for a variety of
research, under the aegis of NSF, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) , Office of Naval Research,
or Naval Oceanographic Office.
—assist in the resupply of arctic DEW-Line bases
and remote antarctic research stations.
—engage in traf f icability studies, gathering data
of icebreaker performance in various ice environments.
2. Icebreaking on the Homefront
Domestic operations have been defined as those
conducted on the east coast from Maine to the Chesapeake Bay,
throughout the Great Lakes, on the upper Mississippi River
system, and in Alaskan waterways except along the northern
shore [Ref. 42]. The domestic Alaskan tasks have
23

historically involved assisting vessels to reach Anchorage
through Cook Inlet, and occasional clearing of small boat
harbors in exceptional conditions [Ref . 42]
.
The level of commercial support has long been
controversial. Shipping interests on the Great Lakes, for
example, strongly support moves to extend the shipping
season, even to the point of year-round navigation. This is
feasible with the commitment of enough icebreakers to do the
task; but the economic advantage to private concerns must be
balanced with the public cost. Providing service on a
reimbursable basis has been suggested, but never adopted for
domestic icebreaking. The Coast Guard's current domestic
icebreaking policy provides that [Ref. 159]
:
— icebreaking operations will be conducted to keep
open those principal waterways which are not normally closed
to commerce in the winter.
— icebreaking operations will be conducted to
maintain traditional commercial navigation seasons on
principal waterways which are not normally open to year-round
navigation.
— the Coast Guard will extend the season or attempt
to provide year-round navigation where benefit/cost studies
indicate that it is in the national interest.
—the Coast Guard may provide icebreaking services
when requested by the Corps of Engineers to aid in the
prevention of flooding caused by ice jams.
—any icebreaking required in the pursuit of search
and rescue missions will be conducted.
— the Coast Guard will not normally compete or




Domestic policy is significant to arctic Alaska
because the two modes are beginning to merge in this area.
Even though it is U. S. territory and waters, arctic Alaska
is a polar region and has been virtually devoid of commercial
marine traffic. The latter feature has begun to change. As
private enterprises have moved into the picture, the Coast
Guard has assisted barge convoys pushing through to Prudhoe
Bay. With the possibility of huge increases in marine
traffic, the service faces some thorny policy issues on the
employment of its shrinking icebreaker fleet. These issues
will be pursued in later chapters.
D. CURRENT ICEBREAKER RESOURCES
The Second World War left the country with ample
icebreaker resources relative to what had been available in
the pre-war era. The deep-draft fleet consisted of seven
WIND-class ships and MACKINAW, with STORIS and a number of
ice-strengthened buoy tenders providing additional
capability. The Navy commissioned GLACIER in 1955. As
discussed previously, these ships found a number of missions
supporting various activities in the polar regions and on
domestic waterways; there had been little need for
acquisitions or decommisssionings when the Coast Guard became
the nation*"s sole icebreaker operator in 1965.
As the 1960s drew to a close, it became apparent that
some provision for replacing the WIND-class vessels was
25

needed. EASTWIND was the first of the class to retire, in
1968. In 1971, after three years of study, Lockheed
Shipbuilding and Construction Company was awarded a $53
million contract to build the first of a new class of polar
icebreakers. Although original plans called for four of
these ships, only two were actually funded. After exten-
sive construction delays, POLAR STAR was delivered on the
last day of 1975 and was followed two years later by POLAR
SEA.
The POLAR-class vessels represent an enormous increase in
icebreaker performance and capability. Although 50 per cent
longer than the WIND-class, the new icebreakers have twice
the displacement, and the option of applying up to 60,000
continuous shaft horsepower (see Table 1-1) . A "rule of
thumb" measure of icebreaker effectiveness is the maximum
available horsepower per ton of displacement [Ref . 14] ; the
POLAR-class ratio is 4.55 compared to 1.54 for the "WINDS."
In an operational comparison, the WIND-class can break
approximately 75 linear feet of six-foot fast ice per ram
before backing for another run, while the POLAR-class can
break the same ice continuously at three knots and ice up to
21 feet thick by ramming [Ref. 39]
.
This degree of icebreaking capability is achieved by an
engineering plant of six diesel generators driving three
electric motors, and three gas turbines. Power can be
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controllable pitch propellers. The fragility of propellers
with movable blades has continually plagued the POLAR-class,
and problems with this innovation have caused several polar
deployments to be aborted. The propeller hubs have been
subjected to extensive re-engineering. Both ships are
currently considered fully available for deployment [Ref.
167] .
Delays in delivery and full operational capability of the
POLAR-class caused severe disruptions in icebreaker
scheduling, as EDISTO, STATEN ISLAND and SOUTHWIND were
decommissioned without replacement in the early 1970s.
BURTON ISLAND was retained for three years beyond her
scheduled decommissioning, finally passing out of service in
1978. POLAR STAR and POLAR SEA thus replaced five of the
WIND-class vessels on the rationale that increased
operational capability compensated for the loss in quantity.
As shown in Table 1-1, today's polar icebreaker fleet
consists of five vessels, including the two newest, the aging
GLACIER and two reworked WINDS. They are not under
centralized command, being dispersed in homeports on the West
coast (POLAR STAR and POLAR SEA in Seattle, GLACIER in Long
Beach) , in the Great Lakes (WESTWIND in Milwaukee) , and on
the eastern seaboard (NORTHWIND in Wilmington, North
Carolina) under the district commander of the appropriate
geographic area. STORIS is homeported in Kodiak, Alaska and
ice-strengthened buoy tenders are located on the southern
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Alaskan coast as well as in the continental United States.
In fiscal year 1980, the Coast Guard spent $21.4 million
operating and maintaining ships and aircraft for the polar
icebreaking program, of which $2.7 million was reimbursed by
"user" agencies [Ref . 167] . The expense of the program has
risen dramatically in recent years, as inflationary forces
have pushed up fuel and personnel costs. A number of
techniques have been implemented to increase ship
availability and to control costs, many of which encompass
quite untraditional ways of running ships. The POLAR-class
was designed to operate with a crew of 140, compared to 174
and 197 for the Wind-class and GLACIER, respectively. This
was achieved through automation, principally of engineroom
watchstanding , and maintenance augmentation from ashore. Low
maintenance construction materials and preventive maintenance
systems were also features in design. The POLAR-class
vessels are co-located in Seattle at a support facility which
provides supply, personnel and engineering assistance.
More ship availability is a recognized means of employing
the resource more efficiently. For years the Coast Guard has
"piggy-backed" missions on the icebreakers, fulfilling
multiple user requirements simultaneously. Many research
projects are compatible, for example, with each other and
with transits. Optimum geographic location of homeports, to
reduce time spent in transit, has also received
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consideration. Most radical is the concept of multi-crewing
:
the POLAR-class manning levels were set on the basis of three
full crews for the two ships. This would in theory allow 270
days of ship operating time per year, with no individual
crewman away from home more than 180 days. In the severe
budgetary climate of the late 1970s, however, the third crew
was never funded and it is suspected that the technological
complexity of the vessels will not allow 270 days of
operations each year [Ref . 167] .
How adequate are the existing icebreaker resources? Two
in-house Coast Guard studies in 1975 and 1979 estimated that
icebreaker requirements in the 1981-2000 period would average
890 and 819 days per year, respectively [Refs. 37, 42].
These figures were based on surveys of the user
organizations, fitting these projected requirements into
feasible schedules. Both studies also concluded that these
requirements cannot be met with existing resources. In
addition to calculating the number of ship-days available,
icebreaker scheduling is complicated by [Ref. 37]
:
—concentration of user demand at certain times of the
year.
—some missions which require two ships working jointly.
—the high level of vessel risk in the polar environ-
ments, making backup capability necessary.
A number of program changes are in the planning process.
Budget requests for fiscal year 1982 include $10.6 million
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for re-engining STORIS to upgrade her horsepower from 1800 to
4000 SHP. Her performance in 1975 North Slope tug and barge
convoying was marginal, and the added power would make STORIS
more effectively suited to the shallow water of Alaska's
arctic coastline. Also requested for 1982 is $113.8 million
for the first of two dual-draft icebreakers. These are
replacement vessels for WESTWIND and NORTHWIND, and are
designed to have a shallow draft for winter work in the Great
Lakes and a deeper draft for summer deployments to the
eastern arctic. Draft would be varied by the amount of fuel
carried [Ref . 167] . Coast Guard headquarters has also
completed a mission needs statement for a shallow draft
icebreaker for arctic Alaska, an early step in the
acquisition process [Ref. 163].
Forecasting future icebreaking requirements is a highly
intuitive business. Yet the long lead time for building new
vessels, the growth of important new requirements, and the
austerity of the current budgetary environment necessitate
decision-making far in advance of firm information. Of all
the icebreaker operating areas, the eastern arctic and
traditional domestic waterways appear least likely to
experience the largest growth in requirements. Certainly
this could be changed by policy revisions, such as year-round
navigation on the Great Lakes. The antarctic seems more
speculative. There is an increasing awareness of resources
at the "bottom of the world," and it seems highly likely that
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the United States would insist on participating in any moves
to exploit them. There is nothing to indicate immediate
movement, however.
Action in the arctic looms most ominously on the horizon.
Events are already occurring which involve icebreaker support
as well as other Coast Guard responsibilities; the STORIS
rework and shallow draft icebreaker represent responses to
these trends. Yet the scope of events in arctic Alaska
potentially involve great changes and could ultimately have a
huge impact on icebreaking. Understanding the background of
this area is a first step in understanding its future.
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II. BACKGROUND; ARCTIC ALASKA TO THE PRESENT
Alaska retains, in the minds of most Americans, a flavor
of adventure and mystery that has been associated with the
land over much of its history. The name derives either from
an Aleut word, "alakshak," which refers to the mainland of
the Alaska Peninsula, or is from the Eskimo meaning "great
land." The latter truly befits the superlative nature of
this state.
A. HISTORY
One of the thrusts of post-Renaissance Europe's outreach
for treasure and exploration was the search for a Northwest
Passage. Although Norse ships had earlier pushed beyond
Greenland into the Labrador Sea and on to the fringes of
North America, the European search for the fabled water route
to the East began in earnest when Cabot sailed for Cathay in
1497. He was followed by a host of others, all unsuccessful,
until Amundsen transited the ice-bound route early in this
century.
Its remoteness shielded Alaska from European contact
until Vitus Bering sighted Mount St. Elias and sent men
ashore in 1741. As "Russian America," the vast territory was
soon recognized as a rich area for whaling, sealing and
fishing; lying beyond the vast expanses of Siberia, the
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Russian colonizers never saw Alaska as more than a source for
these commodities.
The huge territory became the last significant
acquisition in a new nation's manifest destiny when the
United States purchased it on October 16, 1867. The $7.2
million price made Alaska infamous as "Seward's folly" and as
an icy wasteland. These complaints dissipated, however, and
by the turn of the century Alaska achieved notoriety for gold
and adventure by the literature of Jack London and Robert
Service. Even as a possession of the United States, the
territory remained, for all intents and purposes, a colony.
The Second World War brought convulsive change to Alaska.
Japanese feints at Kiska and Attu, although far out in the
Aleutian Chain, were answered by a large military buildup.
The Alaska Highway was carved out of wilderness, creating the
first all-land transportation link to the territory. In the
postwar era, the military remained as Alaska's largest
employer. The importance of geographic location was
heightened by the cold war and brought construction of a key
string of early warning stations (BMEWS and the DEW-Line) and
aircraft interceptor bases.
In 1959, the Statehood Act was passed by Congress and
Alaska became the forty-ninth state. There were only 211,000
residents [Ref. 8] living on the 375 million acre expanse.
Alaska's history to this point can be characterized as a
series of transformations, where aboriginal Alaska yielded to
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colonial Alaska and then was changed by the exigencies of
wartime into garrison Alaska [Ref . 22] . With the advent of
colonization, the Great Land had become an area useful
primarily for outside purposes: for resource exploitation
and for defense of a national heartland.
Statehood dramatically altered this pattern by shifting a
great deal of political control from a distant Congress to
the residents themselves. Although the federal government
retained title to most of the state, the Statehood Act
allowed Alaska to select 103 million acres of land over the
following 25 years for its own purposes. This provision was
to be significant.
B. OIL AND THE NEW YUKON FEVER
Although nationally unnoticed until Atlantic Richfield
Company (ARCO) announced the 1968 Prudhoe Bay strike, oil had
been known to exist in Alaska for a number of decades. Early
travellers noted natural seeps of oil along the arctic coast,
and the first exploration on the North Slope was conducted by
Standard Oil in 1921 [Ref. 18] . A large segment of northwest
Alaska was designated Naval Petroleum Reserve #4 two years
later by President Harding, although Navy drilling programs
in 1944-53 and 1974-77 produced nothing significant [Ref.
51]. In 1957 the first oil well began flowing in Kenai, and
six years later the first offshore well was sunk in Cook
Inlet, beginning modest production in south central Alaska.
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ARCO's announcement of the huge Prudhoe structure on July
18, 1968 did bring petroleum into the spotlight. The
estimation ran to 10 billion barrels of recoverable oil; but
it lay underground in an environment new to the oil industry
and where advances in technology would be needed for
exploitation. While drilling obstacles were significant, it
rapidly became apparent that the overriding problem would be
one of transporting the extracted crude oil.
Several trans-Canadian pipeline routes were proposed, to
bring the oil to southern Canada where it could be funnelled
into pre-existing pipeline systems. Although pipeline
technology was well established, construction in the low
temperatures, seasonal extremes and permafrost conditions
posed formidable engineering problems. Additionally, a
Canadian route would be 2400 miles in length and require the
consent of a sovereign country [Refs. 54, 71].
A similar idea surfaced for a pipeline across Alaska to a
suitable terminal port on the southern coast. It would be
only 800 miles long, yet would necessitate a marine terminal
and an extensive tanker fleet.
More exotic proposals for air cushion tanker vehicles and
tanker submarines were studied [Refs. 54, 63, 83]. But one
of the more interesting ideas that remained within the bounds
of realistic technology and economics was a system of
icebreaking tankers. This became an especially attractive
alternative since the production from Prudhoe Bay was most
36

urgently needed on the U. S. east coast. The concept of
large icebreaking tankers plying the Northwest Passage
appeared to be a pragmatic solution as well as the romantic
fulfillment of a centuries-old dream.
To test the feasibility of the concept, Humble Oil (now
Exxon) had a 115,000 deadweight ton tanker re-engined and
fitted with an icebreaking bow in a joint project with ARCO
and British Petroleum. In August 1969 the 1005-foot
MANHATTAN departed Philadelphia to transit the Northwest
Passage and arrived at Point Barrow, Alaska a month later.
Although the ship received some assistance from an
accompanying Canadian icebreaker and sustained minor damage
on the return trip, the overall concept was proven in a
dramatic way. The costs, however, were sobering: on the
basis of the vessel's performance, it was estimated that
year-round operation would require 100,000 to 150,000 shaft
horsepower (SHP) instead of MANHATTAN'S 43,000; and the
projected cost per ship was revised upward from $30 million
into the $75 to 100 million range [Ref. 26].
MANHATTAN made a second trip into Baffin Bay and the
eastern arctic archipelago in the spring of 1970, but the
transportation mode she represented lost in the final
decision process. The consortium of oil companies elected
instead to build the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS)
.
The factors in this choice may have included:
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— the absence of proven reserves in sufficient quantity
to develop a new technology, including a deepwater loading
terminal in the Beaufort Sea. Pipeline technology was
probably felt to be closer to "state of the art" [Refs. 29,
40] .
— the more uncertain economics of icebreaking tanker
operation [Ref. 29],
—potentially lucrative "swap" possibilities, including
shipment of Alaskan oil to Japan in return for Caribbean
deliveries, which might yield more profit for the companies
[Ref. 6] . None of these have materialized, since the
authorizing legislation for TAPS specifically banned export
of the oil.
—avoidance of the sovereignty problems that a trans-
Canadian pipeline or the Northwest Passage would present; in
fact, the MANHATTAN operation raised serious concern in
Canada about the status of her arctic waterways [Ref. 6] (see
Chapter VII)
.
The real reasons behind the decision can only be
speculation, but its effect was immediate and intense.
Coming as it did at the peak of national ecological and
environmental concern, TAPS aroused significant opposition.
Various analyses showed the chosen alternative to be
environmentally and economically inferior to other modes
[Ref. 6] . Congress acted in 1971 to settle native claims in
Alaska, an issue that had been dormant for years; the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act provided 40 million acres and $1
billion to the 43,000 natives through their membership in a
system of 13 native corporations [Ref. 15] . In January of
the same year, the Department of the Interior filed a
preliminary assessment of ecological impact for the project,




TAPS was subsequently challenged in court. The State of
Alaska, the Interior Department and the oil companies were
sued by an alliance of Alaska natives, fishermen, Canadian
environmentalists, and American environmental groups which
included the Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund
and Friends of the Earth [Ref . 6] . A court injunction
against construction of the pipeline was granted. In March
1972, the Interior Department released an environmental
impact statement and economic and security analysis of the
project [Ref. 54] . After much lobbying and other legal
maneuvering, TAPS received final legislative approval of the
Congress in the form of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act of November 1973. It benefitted at the
eleventh hour from the October 1973 oil embargo.
The Authorization Act did not represent a clear-cut
victory for the oil companies and their development-minded
allies. It was above all a piece of compromise legislation,
mandating significant environmental safeguards. These
included extensive baseline studies of the environment,
construction techniques that would minimize wilderness and
wildlife impact, and strong monitoring of construction and
operation. For example, tankers carrying crude oil from the
pipeline's southern terminus in Valdez were prohibited from
discharging oily water at any point on their voyages; this
common ballasting procedure was replaced by a water treatment
plant in Valdez that processes contaminated water from
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arriving ships and recovers 3000 barrels of oil per day.
Water returned to Prince William Sound contains 4-6 parts per
million oil, against an allowable standard of 8 ppm [Ref.
101]
.
The pipeline was built with sufficient overhead
clearances to allow passage of reindeer herds in certain
areas, and sits on refrigerated stanchions to prevent melting
of the permafrost. While not satisfying the most vociferous
critics, these types of safeguards produced an end result
that was significantly different from what had been planned.
The construction phase had a convulsive social impact on
the state. With the pressure of several years' delay and the
limitations of the seasons, the builders paid exorbitant
wages to attract skilled workers to the project and to keep
labor peace. Uncontrolled growth of towns, skyrocketing
prices, and large numbers of transients resulted. And
although the pipeline greatly increased the economic base of
the state, most of the boom faded when the mammoth project
was finished. A future wave of development brings mixed
emotions to most long time Alaskans.
TAPS was completed in May 1977, and the first barrel of
Prudhoe Bay crude reached Valdez on the 28th of July [Ref.
4]
.
The cost of what was billed as the largest privately
financed project in history had escalated from the planned
$800 million to over $8 billion. The MANHATTAN, in spite of
her icebreaking capabilities, now carries Prudhoe Bay oil to
the U. S. west coast. The wisdom of the TAPS decision can be
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called into question; and with the prospect of more petroleum
development it is of more than academic interest to ask if a
similar project would be undertaken again.
C. ALASKA AT THE PRESENT
Once in routine operation, TAPS has proven itself
successful. At the end of 1980, 1.52 million barrels flowed
through the 48-inch pipeline each day, representing some 8-10
per cent of U. S. consumption. Construction of extra pump
stations could boost daily flow to two million barrels. Pump
station 7 was completed at the end of 1980, adding no new
throughput but eliminating the need for some expensive drag-
reducing additive [Ref. 135]. The system is monitored by the
Interior Department's Alaska Pipeline Office, and marine
operations are regulated by the U. S. Coast Guard. The state
asserts a regulatory function through the Alaska Department
of Environmental Conservation. There have been minor
operating problems, including small leaks and adverse winter
weather precluding tanker loading, but TAPS has remained free
of any major catastrophies
.
The Coast Guard's role is a significant one. The
Authorization Act mandated that a vessel traffic service
(VTS) be established for Prince William Sound, to provide
navigational assistance to TAPS tanker traffic along with a
system of traffic lanes, speed limits, operating rules and
radar monitoring. The effect of TAPS traffic on the pristine
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and biologically abundant waters of Prince William Sound was
a major concern of the environmentalists, and the Coast Guard
regulatory presence addresses this issue in seeking to reduce
the risk of a vessel casualty. The Marine Safety Office in
Valdez provides additional on-scene capability in conducting
the commercial vessel safety, port safety and marine
environmental protection programs. Coast Guard involvement
with TAPS is a significant precedent for oil development and
transportation.
Financially, the oil flowing from Prudhoe Bay has been a
bonanza for the state. Taxes and royalty revenue now
register about $300 to 350 million monthly, and by November
1980 Alaska had accumulated a fund of $2 billion. Although
officials have, with considerable historical irony, invested
some of this in gold bullion [Ref. 88] and abolished the
state income tax, this reservoir of capital will in all
likelihood be used to back further development projects as
well. One indication is that Alaska, along with several
other states, has set up a state-financed venture capital
organization. The state is also considering acquisition of
a 255-foot ice-strengthened research vessel [Ref. 167].
A major undertaking now in progress is the Alaska Natural
Gas Transportation System. At a projected cost now placed at
$40 billion, this 4800-mile pipeline is designed to bring
Prudhoe Bay natural gas through Canada to the continental U.
S. It will initially move 1.1 billion cubic feet per day of
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Canadian gas and when finished will supply approximately 5
per cent of U. S. gas consumption. Arrangements for the
project have been complex and delicate. Federal law, for
example, precluded the Prudhoe producing companies from
ownership in the pipeline; the Canadians have sought
reassurance that the entire system will be built before
committing to their portion of it; and securing financing for
such a mammoth project has been difficult. The State of
Alaska may participate in building the $2.3 - 3.0 billion
conditioning plant at Prudhoe Bay, and an initial contract
for this facility has been let [Ref. 129]. Portions of the
pipeline are now under construction. Approval has been
received for 430 miles of right of way on federal land,
leaving 311 miles of state, native and private land still
under negotiation [Ref. 98]. It seems reasonable to say that
the line will be built, but the targeted 1985 completion date
seems certain to slip [Ref. 169].
Exploration for oil is imminent in a number of promising
areas in Alaska, as will be discussed in Chapter IV. The
heated battle over disposition and future use of huge land
areas has recently reached a momentary lull; this is
described in Chapter VI. The mood in Alaska can perhaps be
characterized, at the risk of simplification, as generally
favoring development but with stringent controls and local
participation. There is, of course, a multiplicity of
interests in the state. The residents of Alaska are well
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aware of their enormous resource potential and its value in
an energy-hungry world; but perhaps because of the past they
are extremely sensitive to outside manipulation. Alaska will
refuse to be merely a treasure trove, and it is in this
context that future development will occur.
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Ill . THE FUTURE AND ARCTIC ALASKA
Alaska's history of resource exploitation and the
tumultous events of recent years leave the state, or at least
certain portions of it, poised for a rather uncertain future.
The differences in the various possibilities are large. The
arctic basin may become the Persian Gulf of this era,
producing a huge stream of hydrocarbons to feed the world's
appetite for energy; or it may remain in a stable state with
only peripheral inroads from "development." The course
between these extremes that events will eventually follow is
difficult to foresee. The subj ect iveness of the observer and
the imaginative appeal of large changes make evaluation even
more elusive.
The Coast Guard will have to react to events and demands
from the external environment that are perceived to fall
within the scope of its responsibilities. This is the
cornerstone of organizational strategy. Secondarily there
must be an identification, as one text presents it, of the
distinctive competence that ideally equips the Coast Guard to
fill the needs. This leads to development of adequate human
and physical resources [Ref. 2].
Although this age is recognized as one of accelerating
change, the lead time required for organizational reaction
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seems to be lengthening. Implementation of new operational
systems, development of personnel expertise and acquisition
of capital facilities involve structured procedure. Though
it would be wrong to spring immediately to the conclusion
that arctic development will require a new type of icebreaker
for the Coast Guard, this situation would for example,
necessitate ten years between identification of the need and
commissioning of the first ship [Ref. 162]. The organization
must therefore have a lengthy (and lengthening) "weather eye"
for future shifts in the winds of change.
The problem then, is one of determining the future of
targeted areas of interest and the Coast Guard's role in
them, far enough in advance to allow action. Our
rationalistic view of the world leaves us without a belief in
oracles or spiritual seers; but modern thought hardly
conceptualizes the occurrence of events as completely random.
Trend extrapolation, scenario-writing, expert consensus
techniques, and simulation and modeling all have parts to
play in future study. Extrapolation of the past and present
is the most common of these.
The future effect of certain trends in the arctic are
reasonably clear. A primary impact on the Coast Guard's
present role in arctic Alaska will be through marine
transportation. This is important due to the orientation of
the Coast Guard's organizational objectives and statutory
responsibility, and partially to the legacy of the Alaska
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Pipeline where North Slope barge convoys and tanker traffic
from the terminus were the Coast Guard's main concerns. It
can also be rather obviously surmised that any large-scale
development in Alaska's future will be dominated by petroleum
and natural gas resources. Virtually any development of
these resources in the arctic regions will involve some form
of marine transportation.
The brunt of Coast Guard impact will undoubtedly fall on
the icebreaking program, and a number of issues are involved.
Icebreaking operations in the midst of a large commercial
development effort may finally dissolve any remaining
distinction between domestic and polar icebreaking.
Icebreaking assistance to commercial vessels on the North
Slope is now placed under the domestic label [Ref. 167], and
increased icebreaker involvement along these lines may
reorient the program on a geographic basis rather by an
arbitrary distinction between domestic and polar tasks.
Reimbursement for icebreaking service is another issue
lacking resolution. As discussed in Chapter I, commercial
assistance has been rendered for years on traditional
waterways, but it is unclear as to whether similar assistance
should be expected on waters heretofore devoid of commercial
activity [Ref . 164]
.
Assessing the impact of events is complicated by a
potential overlap of programs. Search and rescue, short
range aids to navigation, enforcement of laws and treaties,
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marine environmental protection, port safety and security,
and military preparedness/operations are all likely to have
applications in future Alaskan arctic activity. In executing
these functions, icebreakers will without question be
utilized to a great extent, since in many arctic areas during
much of the year only these ships will be capable of putting
Coast Guard resources on the scene. Icebreakers may become
much more multi-program units than in the recent past.
The foregoing outline touches only briefly on the future
factors affecting arctic Alaska and the Coast Guard.
Predicting the shape of things to come involves the
examination of highly complex and contingent events.
Attempts at fitting all the pieces together by intuitive
means is probably beyond the rational/analytical capability
of the human mind. There are simply too many separate
streams of events and processes in motion to be examined in
toto. Nor does the subject lend itself well to a programmed
approach: only partial quantification is realistic and the
relationships and contingencies are generally too nebulous to
specify with mathematical precision.
One method of overcoming this problem of scale is to
break the "picture" down into smaller, more comprehensible
areas for closer scrutiny. The risk in doing this, however,
is the same risk faced by any use of specialization: loss of
overall perspective and of the essential interconnectedness
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of the segments. Yet organized and thorough analysis demands
some compar tmenta ion of the field, with careful relating of
the results to compile an understanding of the whole.
The "break-down" approach represents one methodological
aspect of this study. Five issues which pertain to the
future of arctic Alaska and icebreaking activities have been
identified from a review of literature and discussion with
individuals close to unfolding events. Each of these issues
will be examined in detail, with the goal of identifying the
likely future by informally extrapolating trends and
flavoring them with scenarios, opinions and "best guesses."
Before describing these five issues, however, a number of
basic assumptions underlying the study must be restated for
clarity. These include:
-- undeveloped oil and gas resources exist in arctic
Alaska (including the Bering Sea) in commercially practical
quantities
.
— though all necessary technology is not in existence, it
is within reach; and technology per se is not the most
significant barrier to the future development of oil and gas
reserves
.
—exploitation of other minerals will remain far behind
oil and gas development. The U. S. Bureau of Mines estimates
130 billion tons of coal in Alaska, ninety percent of it
north of the Brooks Range [Ref. 59]. Commercial quantities
of the following minerals are also believed to exist [Refs.
41, 57] :
>copper >tungsten >molybdenum >silver
>fluorite >mercury >lead >nickel




The demand for these minerals is much less than current
petroleum needs, and development of the former may become
economic once a functioning transportation system is in place
[Ref . 40] .
—other commercial ventures in arctic Alaska, such as
fisheries and tourism, will remain minor compared to oil and
gas efforts.
—marine transportation will play at least some role in
the region's development; at the present it is the only
economic means of moving large quantities of material in the
arctic.
—Coast Guard objectives and programs will remain roughly
in line with the status quo, with no significant additions or
deletions of responsibility. The Coast Guard will therefore
retain its organizational orientation toward marine-related
transportation.
—as stated above, the future of arctic Alaska will have
its major impact on the Coast Guard through waterborne
transportation.
With these guiding assumptions, the following five issues
will be examined:
1. Energy development . Perhaps the singly most
important factor in arctic Alaska's future, petroleum and
natural gas energy is to a large extent the fountainhead of
many other "downstream" occurrences. What will transpire is,
of course, far from certain. Although the country is in the
midst of an almost obsessive concern for "Energy," and
"energy independence" has become a catchword, there is little
that could be called a national energy policy. Energy
development in arctic Alaska will be influenced by a host of
public policy issues, international economic factors, and
foreign political events, but these factors will be
significant only in the long run and cannot be confidently
50

predicted. What will be examined are the energy-related
activities now in process in Alaska, and the directions in
which they point.
2. Energy-related transportation. As previoulsy noted,
the development of energy resources in arctic Alaska will
undoubtedly entail substantial movement of materials by
water. Marine activity may be principally a support function
for exploration and construction operations, much as barge
traffic to the North Slope has been utilized for Prudhoe Bay
operations. Much more significantly for the Coast Guard the
marine mode is a likely alternative for transporting oil and
natural gas to collection points or to markets if production
levels rise sufficiently.
3. Concerns for the natural and social environment. The
concept of "progress" has recently undergone a significant
redefinition in this country, where development of natural
resources has always been considered desirable. The Trans-
Alaska Pipeline was one of the first large-scale projects to
be confronted by the new environmentalism; this was reflected
not only as outright opposition but also resulted in
construction of a greatly modified pipeline. The "TAPS
precedent" will undoubtedly flavor any new plans for
development in Alaska.
4. Canadian arctic developments. With a vast expanse of
arctic frontage, Canada is much more oriented toward northern
resources than is the United States. A number of Canadian
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projects are underway in the high latitudes that are highly
ambitious in scope and involve high technological
sophistication. This type of arctic leadership may exert
enough influence to pull arctic Alaskan development along the
same lines. In addition, the very real possibility of
Canadian energy exports to Japan through the Bering Straits
presages a direct and significant impact on Coast Guard
responsibilities.
5. The international perspective. A number of issues
point to a growing international significance for the arctic.
These include concerns such as protecting development efforts
there, sovereignty issues related to transportation and
resource exploitation, Soviet arctic efforts, and the
potential for military and naval operations in the arctic. A
federal interdepartmental policy group has been formed to
study and discuss national policy for the area. A review of
events in arctic Alaska and future icebreaker needs must also
look beyond domestic commercial concerns to the exigencies of
national security, and to the impact that present and
prospective arctic developments will have on the world as a
whole.
The foregoing issues form the framework of this study.
While this overview and integrative approach in no way
presumes to be comprehensive, it appears to offer the most
clear-cut means of examining the complexities involved. The
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framework fits well the most pertinent trends and influencing
factors.
Chapters IV through VIII will examine each of the five
issues in detail. Chapter IX will seek to combine and





A. THE HYDROCARBON ENERGY PICTURE
In recent years world events have projected hydrocarbon
energy, and particularly petroleum, into the international
spotlight. The speed of this transition to prominence was
remarkable not only for its convulsive abruptness but also
for the incredible complexity of economic, political,
religious and ethnic factors underlying the change. In one
sense, the oil embargo of 1973 and the continuing price
increases for this commodity have forced world awareness of
the finiteness of petroleum and natural gas resources. The
industrialized nations especially were relieved of their
illusions that such cheap and convenient energy would last
forever
.
The "energy crisis" is perhaps more accurately labelled
as a petroleum crisis (with its natural gas first cousin
following closely in the same vein) . In 1979, oil
represented 46 per cent of primary U. S. energy consumption,
and natural gas accounted for another 25 per cent [Ref. 47].
With the advantage of several years 1 hindsight, it can be
seen how fortuitous the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay
really was. Atlantic Richfield's 1968 announcement was made
five years before the OPEC hammer fell, and added a
significant flow of domestic oil to the American economy
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relatively quickly. Although developments beyond the initial
production area have proceeded slowly for a variety of
reasons, the potential impact of arctic offshore and onshore
resources is huge.
Estimation of hydrocarbon reserves is truly an art of
augury. Figures are in abundance but, of course, come with
no guarantees. In a global context, it is estimated that
there are 648.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and
2,638 trillion cubic feet of natural gas worldwide [Ref.
138], of which some 10-12 billion are in Alaska. Estimates
of undiscovered reserves are much less firm; U. S. Geological
Survey figures, expressed in terms of probabilities, seem to
be accepted as most authoritative. Table 4-1 contains USGS
reserve estimates for Alaska and the continental U. S., and
Figure 4-1 indicates the hierarchy of oil and gas categories.
The estimated Alaskan resources in Table 4-1 are
significant, especially those for oil. It must also be
considered that the continental United States has been much
more thoroughly explored than has Alaska's northern areas,
and figures for the latter may therefore be low. In the
opposite vein, resources that are technologically recoverable
may not be economically practical for production.
The supply-demand context is worth considering, although
as indicated in the previous chapter, the complex realm of
world events behind supply and demand is beyond the scope of
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declining U. S. consumption, matched with a 1.4 per cent
increase in domestic production. The increase was due
largely to stepped-up flow through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
(TAPS) , but to some degree it also results from a slowing of
the decline in "lower 48" production. World petroleum output
simultaneously decreased 5 per cent, to its lowest level in
three years [Ref. 138]. These trends seems likely to
continue. Economic pressure for development of domestic
sources will grow with each incremental rise in the price of
imported oil.
Areas of present and potential hydrocarbon development
fall into natural geographic divisions, illustrated by Figure
4-2. The Prudhoe Bay field, established by current
production, lies between the immense National Petroleum
Reserve-Alaska (formerly Naval Petroleum Reserve #4) , and the
William 0. Douglas Arctic Wildlife Range extending eastward
to the Canadian border. The Beaufort and Chukchi Seas are
nearshore portions of the Arctic Ocean, with the Bering Sea
encompassing Hope and Navarin Basins, Norton Sound and
Bristol Bay.
The Department of the Interior's "Final 5-Year OCS Oil &
Gas Leasing Schedule" of June 1980 utilizes these large
geographic areas. Each lease area is broken down into small
tracts averaging 6-8 square miles. Federal leasing of the












year process comprised of the following events:
--nominations
--tentative tract selection
--submission of draft environmental statements, for each
tract
--public hearing
— submission of final environmental statements
—proposed notice of sale




Lease procedures are complicated by the fact that the state
leases offshore areas inside of a three-mile boundary from
any land area, with federal control outside this limit. The
state of Alaska has disputed this arrangement by filing suit
with the Supreme Court. It could be two to five years before
the issue is presented to the justices [Ref. 126].
B. THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Production of oil and natural gas in an arctic
environment is a far more complex and expensive undertaking
than has been the case elsewhere. Most large reservoirs of
petroleum have been exploited in areas where it is easily
produced and close to user markets. The oil crisis of the
seventies has moved the development process to a new plane:
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more expensive techniques such as deep-drilling and secondary
recovery (injection of water or gas to maintain pressure) are
now feasible, and adverse environments such as the North Sea
and the arctic are increasingly attractive.
The difficulties facing arctic energy development stem
from two physical features of the region: uneven annual
distribution of daylight and low winter temperatures [Ref.
21]. These make most work highly seasonal, pose severe
stresses on personnel and equipment, and inflict
substantially higher costs. Construction of TAPS
demonstrated how a month's slippage in a crucial step could
mean a year's delay; and this seasonal inflexibility proved
even more important in barging materials to the North Slope.
The process of oil and natural gas development can be
subdivided into three phases. Exploration generally begins
within a year after the lease sale and may continue up to
four years. The purpose is to discover oil (or natural gas)
and determine the economic feasibility for extracting it
[Ref. 48], Although analysis of surface geology and earth
gravity surveys done with aircraft provide useful
information, knowledge of the subsurface geology is
necessary. This information has generally been gathered by
seismic methods which more positively indicate structures
favorable to the presence of oil [Ref. 8]. The existence of
oil must then be proved by drilling. Seismic testing has
been considered to pose little environmental risk, although
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this assumption has been called into question for the effect
that blasting and surface activity may have on certain
wildlife species. Exploratory drilling is hazardous: the
danger of blowouts and fire [Ref. 68] poses risk both to the
environment and to personnel on the site. The Bureau of Land
Management (Interior Department) must issue a permit prior to
actual drilling.
Installation is the second phase of development,
following successful exploration activities. In arctic
environments, the duration could stretch from the fourth
through eighth years after lease. A field plan must be
approved by the Geological Survey. Platforms must be
designed and constructed [Ref. 48]; this is difficult on
tundra which turns to quagmire during summer, but especially
so for arctic offshore work. Drilling from the low, flat
Barrier Islands, or construction of artificial gravel islands
seem to be preferred methods for exploratory work underway in
nearshore Beaufort Sea areas. Man-made islands are
notoriously expensive on the gravel-poor North Slope, and
represent an extensive disruption of the natural setting.
This solution is not at all viable for deeper water. In
addition, 15 meters (52 feet) is considered the maximum for
conventional jack-up rigs which are in any event a seasonal
alternative [Ref. 165] . An ice island tested by Exxon in the
Beaufort Sea was unsuccessful as a drilling platform due to
undercutting by wave action [Ref. 126], Deepwater rigs that
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can withstand the forces of winter ice are still conceptual,
although some interesting designs have emerged. Platforms
with hollow, bell-shaped bottoms and sloped " icebreaking"
sides have been proposed; they would be towed to the drilling
site, filled with seawater and frozen [Ref. 74].
Beyond the problem of suitable platforms, production is
generally less hazardous than putting in exploratory wells
[Ref. 68]. This is due to the better understanding of
geologic structure gained during exploration activities. The
installation phase also requires development of support
systems. Transportation for the increased number of
personnel and large volumes of materials and equipment is
needed, and if arctic efforts expand beyond the developed
facilities at Prudhoe Bay, most transportation requirements
will have to be met by shipping.
The final development phase is that of production . The
arctic environment has stretched the time from drill permit
to production from a normal five years to an estimated 8-10
years [Ref. 164], It can only begin when the problems have
been resolved and the stage set by successful installation.
Production from the Prudhoe Bay field has been routine almost
without exception when compared to the intense political
battles and engineering obstacles of its installation. This
stormy implementation was due in large part to transportation
of the crude oil; movement of the petroleum to market was the
focus of most, though not all, of the environmental
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opposition. The same situation seems likely for further
petroleum development in the Alaskan arctic.
A fourth, pre-explorat ion phase could be added to the
foregoing description. Oil companies must decide, usually
with very scanty and incomplete information, on lease areas
to bid for. Acquiring leases represents a substantial outlay
and typifies the gamble of petroleum and natural gas
development. The level of risk reinforces a preoccupation
with rapid payback for investments: the industry is
reluctant to invest in projects which do not present a likely
return within five years [Refs. 165, 168]. Throughout the
development process, the risk of obtaining rights,
discovering and exploiting commercially profitable quantities
of resources is completely assumed by the companies. There
are winners, like the Prudhoe Bay find, but there are also an
ample number of expensive "dry holes." The unfavorable public
image of the multinational companies largely obscures the
degree of this development risk; and the escalating price of
oil has probably increased the risk significantly. In dollar
terms, a barrel of new oil is worth more and more. But oil
must now be sought in unforgiving settings such as the
arctic, where the total cost of development is so much
greater .
C. AREAS OF DEVELOPMENT
With new events occurring almost on a daily basis, it is
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difficult to present a "snapshot" view of the various areas
of potential oil and gas development. However, the following
paragraphs summarize the status of land and offshore regions





Alaska's first arctic oilfield has experienced three
and one-half years of production, pumped over 1.5 billion
barrels by the end of 1980 [Ref. 1301, and reservoir
pressures have decreased exactly as expected [Ref. 126]. At
the current production rate of 1.5 million barrels per day,
the field should last another 20 years, although a decline is
expected around 1990 [Ref. 164]. Peripheral discoveries have
been made in the area, and drilling to the west, northwest
and northeast of the known reservoir gives indications of
important new reserves [Ref. 99]. The producers plan to
begin daily injection of 2.2 million barrels of seawater to
maintain reservoir pressure, adding one billion barrels to
reserves at a cost of $3 billion [Refs. 126,131]. Prudhoe
Bay will, therefore, continue to be a significant production




Currently scene of the most active exploration in
Alaska, the shale formations under the Beaufort Sea are
geologically the same as those containing Prudhoe Bay's oil.
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areas close to Prudhoe [Ref. 126]. In December 1979, 20
major oil companies paid $491.7 million for 25 federal tracts
[Ref. 151], and $567.4 million for 53 state-managed tracts
[Ref. 126]. Only the shallow protected waters inshore of the
Barrier Islands are now attractive from a technological
standpoint, and the 1979 sale brought no bids beyond a depth
of 16 meters (52 feet)
.
Beaufort Sea development, for all of its
attractiveness, is fraught with complications. Separation of
federal and state lease control has resulted in the frequent
inability of companies to do joint drilling, with subsequent
higher costs [Ref. 165]. A map of offshore lease areas is
convoluted by the location of the Barrier Islands and the
three-mile demarcation lines; consequently some of the lease
areas are, as previously mentioned, in dispute. For various
political and legislative reasons, no efforts to settle the
federal-state disputes were made before the lease sale [Ref.
126]. Future court action may change tract management in
some areas.
An additional obstruction to Beaufort Sea exploration
is a lawsuit brought in federal district court by
environmental groups and Alaska natives, claiming the
Interior Department failed to comply with environmental
regulations prior to conducting the 1979 sale. However, the
court has cleared the way for exploratory drilling during
winter 1980-81, allowing the Interior Department to appeal.
68

A similar lawsuit has been brought in Alaska state courts.
The issue has been further complicated as the North Slope
borough has indicated a desire to exert local control by
restricting some tracts for subsistence use only. If
successful, such a move would render them worthless as oil
properties [Ref. 126].
A more significant boundary dispute could emerge when
the February 1983 lease sale opens Beaufort Sea tracts
further to the east and west. The offshore U. S. -Canadian
border is the subject of disagreement, and with extensive
development activity already well underway in the Canadian
Beaufort (see Chapter VII), the disputed boundary adds
another factor of uncertainty [Ref. 126]. The actual value
of the 1983 tracts will depend, however, on results of
current offshore work in the Beaufort Sea [Ref. 99]
.
Work planned or now in progress involves drilling
from the Barrier Islands, from shore or from gravel islands;
it is possible to reach up to 7000 feet laterally from a
drill site [Ref. 126]. SOHIO, Exxon, Conoco, Shell, Mobil,
Phillips, BP Alaska and Chevron have all begun exploratory
drilling [Ref. 99]. Exxon reportedly scored two promising
discoveries a half-mile offshore and beyond the known limits
of the Prudhoe field, although little information was
released by the company [Ref. 109]. Even though construction
of gravel islands costs $1 million per foot of water depth
and requires permits from the Army Corps of Engineers and
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Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Exxon, Amoco, Union
of California and ARCO have applied to build four of the
islands [Ref . 119]
.
The Beaufort Sea is now in the limelight for new oil
discoveries. The activity has not yet, however, revealed any
major new finds. The answers should be quickly forthcoming.
3 . National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
This huge area, covering over six per cent of
Alaska's land area, has been long associated with oil
potential. Early attempts at exploration were disappointing.
Since its renaming and administrative transfer to Interior
Department control in 1977, Husky Oil has conducted explora-
tory work under government contract. The results have also
been discouraging: 22 exploratory wells have yielded 22 dry
holes [Ref. 99] and seismic work has been equally fruitless
[Ref. 52]. Some exploration is still in progress, and
Congress has authorized $117 million for more drilling prior
to offering the area for lease in August 1982, as President
Carter recommended [Ref. 99]. The Department of the Interior
isssued a call for NPR-A nominations in late 1980 [Ref. 124].
For all of its disappointments thus far, the oil and
gas future of NPR-A is not completely bleak. Small wells
have produced gas for the community of Barrow for a number of
years. Additionally, the undeveloped Umiat field is known to
contain 70 million barrels of oil [Ref. 126] . The sheer
vastness of the area tends to mitigate the negative results
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of exploration to date; and the oil companies are eager to
have their "own look" [Ref. 99]. The reserve's proximity and
geologic similarity to the Prudhoe field makes further
exploration reasonable.
4 . William 0. Douglas Arctic Wildlife Refuge
Recognized for its abundance of wildlife and set
aside as a preserve for that reason, this 8.9 million acre
range also has the perhaps unfortunate distinction of being
prime oil and gas territory. The area is considered to be
far more promising than NPR-A. The Geological Survey's 50
per cent resource probabilities listed in Table 4-2 are
hardly certain; they were made without subsurface seismic
data and depend heavily on extrapolation of figures from
nearby areas. Although aeromagnetic
,
gravity and surface
geology surveys have been made, seismic data is needed for
confirmation of resource presence [Ref. 99].
The subsurface rock structures of the range, while
younger than those at Prudhoe Bay, are similar to oil-bearing
structures in the Canadian Beaufort Sea [Ref. 126]. Alaska
senator Ted Stevens, echoing an ARCO statement, labelled the
wildlife range as the most promising oil and gas area in the
country [Ref. 111]. This opinion has been reiterated by the
Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys [Ref.
123] .
The range is home to polar bears, wolves, musk oxen
and migrating birds, as well as the summer calving grounds
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for an estimated 130,000 caribou [Ref. 102]. As such, it
became a bitter issue in the Alaska lands turmoil that was
decided by Congressional action in November 1980 (see Chapter
VI). Senator Stevens has gone on record stating that the
industry has proved drilling not to be harmful to visiting
caribou herds [Ref. Ill] . The Alaska lands bill has provided
for some seismic exploration in the range two years after
enactment (i. e. , in late 1982), with a Congressional
decision on leasing after five years [Ref. Ill] . In any
event, seismic testing should provide a more complete
understanding of oil and gas potential.
5. Bristol Bay
Geologists theorize that these shallow waters may be
extremely promising, and they are considered the industry's
first choice outside of the North Slope and Beaufort Sea.
However, little firm data exists. A good deal of the bay was
excluded from the Interior Department's lease schedule in
deference to state requests made on behalf of fishing
interests [Ref. 99] , but a sale labelled "Northern Aleutian
Shelf" is scheduled for October 1983. This lease area covers
the coastal waters of the Alaska Peninsula forming the
southern portion of Bristol Bay. The exclusion of Bristol
Bay leasing is therefore partially a matter of semantics
[Ref. 174] . The bay is an abundant fishing area, with 1-3




6. St. George Basin
This Bering Sea region is marked by less extensive
and severe ice conditions than Bristol Bay [Ref. 48] and was
once considered most promising. It has, however, been




The area is considered to have good potential. Based
on some seismic work, it could rival Bristol Bay in promise
[Ref. 99] . Oil discoveries on the Russian mainland tend to
support the geologic prospects of the area [Ref. 126] . Year-
round exploratory drilling would be feasible since the waters




Ice cover generally ranges from 4-6 feet for up to
six months [Ref. 48] . The area's potential has been
downgraded somewhat because of dry holes drilled on the
adjacent shoreline [Ref. 99].
9. Norton Sound
A 16-company stratigraphic test was conducted 45
miles south of Nome in the summer of 1980 [Ref. 126] , and
ARCO plans additional testing in 1981 [Ref. 164]. Little
firm evaluative information is currently available. Ice
cover is normally three feet, and up to six feet thick in




Little is. known of potentials for the most remote of
the prospective development areas. Monumental drilling and
transportation problems exist [Ref . 99] , and the federal
schedule included the provison that leases will be made only
if it can be reasonably assumed that adequate technology is
in existence. Like the Navarin and Hope Basins, the Chukchi
Sea borders the US-USSR Convention Line of 1867; if extrac-
tion from these fields occurs, it will raise the questions of
drainage from reservoirs on the Soviet side and the possibil-
ity of Soviet response to activity in the area [Ref. 99]
.
D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
A huge rush of optimism about Alaska's oil and gas
potential followed the Prudhoe Bay discoveries. While there
are promising prospects and some peripheral discoveries have
been made, there have been no subsequent finds on the same
level as Prudhoe Bay. A recent article in an industry
periodical asked, "Alaska: will it ever live up to its
potential?" [Ref. 99]. It may be that Prudhoe will prove to
be the only major oil and gas field in arctic Alaska; but it
is also possible that twelve years have not provided
sufficient time to adequately explore such vast areas,
especially given the technological, political and economic
barriers confronting arctic development. The future course
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Studies undertaken in recent years have estimated
recoverable reserves and development dates. One of the most
comprehensive was done by Energy Resources Company and E. G.
Frankel (ERCO/EGF) for the Coast Guard [Ref. 48]. Some of
the quantitative results of this study, submitted in January
1980, are summarized in Tables 4-2 and 4-3. The study
projected three possible scenarios: pessimistic, optimistic
and highly optimistic development. The resulting numbers,
although representing educated guesses based on the best
information available, are unconvincing even a year after the
study's completion. As can be seen in Table 4-3, the
projected lease sale dates are mostly longer term than those
on the June 1980 lease schedule. The future of arctic energy
development is far too fuzzy for such precision in
projecting.
The national political setting in particular is in a
state of flux with the election of Ronald Reagan in November
1980. His advisers and Secretary of the Interior have
generally taken a pro-growth, pro-production stance; and oil
industry perceptions of the new administration's direction
include:
—an emphasis on increased production, rather than
conservation, in response to the "energy problem" [Ref. 120]
.
—easement of environmental rules, leading to faster
development [Ref. 120] . Consolidating the environmental
statements requirements required for each tract into a single




—accelerated leasing of federal lands, including those
in Alaska [Refs. 120, 129]. Telescoping the leasing process
down to 24 months is a real possibility [Ref. 174],
The announcement of immediate decontrol of oil prices
within days of Reagan's inauguration is further evidence of
his administration's policy direction, as is Energy Secretary
Watts' restoration of offshore California areas to the lease
schedule. National policy is likely, therefore, to change in
favor of more immediate availability of federal land for
exploration. As the ERCO/EGF study noted, expert opinion
seems in agreement that Alaska contains some of the nation's
most promising oil and gas areas; but there is not agreement
on the extent of the resource or on a timetable for
development [Ref. 48], Stepped up exploration does not
ensure that commercial quantities of the resources will be
found, nor that exploiting arctic areas will be preferable to
opportunities elsewhere.
From deduction and a combination of the information
currently available, the following flow of events seems most
likely:
—any significant new production will come first from the
nearshore Beaufort Sea. Even if only minor finds are made,
the proximity to TAPS will make their exploitation
attractive. Oil should begin flowing by 1988, but as a
General Accounting Office report noted, it will primarily
offset declining Prudhoe production [Ref. 110]
.
—accelerated seismic exploration in the Douglas Wildlife
Range seems likely. The area could well symbolize a change
in national policy to favor resource production over somewhat
esoteric and disputed environmental/biological arguments. If
significant resources are found, the pressure to develop them
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will be intense since the area will be easier to exploit than
either the deeper Beaufort Sea waters or the Bering Sea
areas. Production, though with careful controls, will
probably result early in the next decade.
—the National Petroleum Reserve is more speculative.
Exploration leasing could well be expedited, and any
commercially sized finds will be rapidly exploited since the
area does not have the wildlife constraints of the Douglas
Range. It would likewise be preferred over the offshore
areas. Production could begin by the end of the decade.
—successful nearshore Beaufort exploration will enhance
the attractiveness of the deeper waters, but movement of
production into deep water will be delayed by onshore
drilling, if it unfolds. The heavy pack ice and depth of
water problems will keep production from occurring until near
the end of the century.
—production from all areas of the North Slope will not
exceed the two million barrels per day capacity of TAPS
before 2000.
--pressure for a step up of the scheduled lease of Bering
Sea areas will emerge only if offshore and onshore North
Slope results are disappointing. This assumption tends to
push Bering Sea production almost to the end of the century.
It seems unlikely that the industry will scatter its efforts
widely; reinforcing this tendency is the problem of
logistics, advanced technology requirements and lack of data
on Bering Sea reserves.
—Bristol Bay may be an exception of the item above.
Current favorable prospects make it a prime candidate for
inclusion on a revised lease schedule. If less-restricted
exploration is allowed and produces significant reserves,
development could proceed closely on the heels of North Slope
production and in advance of other Bering Sea areas.
—the Chukchi Sea will be the last area to experience
exploratory drilling and production. Logistic remoteness and
weather/ice problems make it unattractive as long as other
areas offer reasonable possibilities. Production will not
occur until after 2000.
The foregoing outlook is primarily a set of reasoned
guesses; Figure 4-3 organizes them on a time scale for





































































































mention. The possible development areas represent many
differences in terrain, weather and ice conditions, legal
status, proximity to logistic bases, proximity to established
production centers, etc. The view is taken that the industry
as a whole will develop new areas in an essentially
sequential manner, rather than simultaneously. This process
is now in effect. Prudhoe Bay was the first step and is
being followed by Beaufort Sea exploration. Industry will
"feel" for the next best prospect by simultaneous
exploration, but major development effort will be focused on
one geographic province at a time. The size of the
investment, the technological difficulties, the lack of good
information on resources, regulatory procedures and legal
challenges all make this reasonable. Development will
proceed from the easiest to most difficult environments.
A primary contingency is also involved. The degree of
success of North Slope areas, as represented by producible
resources, will determine the rate of development of Bering
Sea fields. The Beaufort, NPR-A, and Douglas Range are much
more attractive and have a higher probability of resource
presence; but disappointing results on the North Slope should
increase the pace of Bering Sea development.
General as it is, the outlook presented forms a primary
part of understanding Alaska's more comprehensive future.
Energy development is in many respects the pacesetter of
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events in the region. Transportation, the subject of the
next chapter, is closely associated. Though greatly
dependent on the energy picture, transportation also serves




It is tempting and less complicated to examine arctic
Alaska's potential energy resources without considering
transportation. Although the previous chapter discussed
development as if it were a problem separate from
transportation needs, this division is largely artificial.
Transportation must be available to support the exploration
and installation phases, and a production decision is
dependent on a transportation system to move the product.
Yet transportation is not merely one of several logistic
elements. The applicability of various transportation modes
affects the attractiveness of developing a prospective area
almost as much as the presence of hydrocarbons. The previous
chapter alluded to logistic convenience, and the full impact
of transportation will be pursued here.
Energy-related transportation can be viewed as having two
components: transportation supporting the development
process, and transportation of the product. Both were
significant in the development of Prudhoe Bay, and both will
figure prominently in future energy activities.
A. TRANSPORTATION FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Development activity in the Alaskan arctic is, and will
be, strongly influenced by remoteness from commercial and
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industrial centers and by large material requirements. The
latter encompass everything from drilling equipment to the
awesome amount of support facilities that accompany the pre-
paratory phases as well as actual production. The TAPS
experience is instructive. The pipeline and terminal complex
in Valdez often attract the bulk of attention, but to produce
oil at Prudhoe Bay it was necessary to build a small city.
Most of the cargo tonnage for Prudhoe development was
transported by water.
The gently sloping continental shelf of Alaska's arctic
coast precludes the use of deep draft freighters. Prudhoe
Bay construction relied on a proven standby, the tug and
barge combination, which has served the region since the mid
1950s [Ref. 40]. In 1969, 100,000 tons went to Prudhoe Bay
by this mode [Ref. 71]; 1970 was the peak year with 180,000
tons, and volumes declined after a 70,000 ton lift in 1974
[Ref. 91]. Annual resupply continues, with Crowley Maritime
as the principal carrier to Prudhoe Bay [Ref. 48]
.
Major tug-barge efforts have generally operated in flo-
tilla form. The transit is generally made past Point Barrow,
to offload in Prudhoe Bay and return within a six to eight
week "window" allowed by ice conditions in August and Septem-
ber. North Slope tugs have propulsion systems ranging from
2000 up to 9000 horsepower. The largest barges are 400 by
100 feet wide, with loaded drafts to 20 feet; the lightering
barges can operate in depths over seven feet [Ref. 164].
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Material movements by tug and barge appear to be an
assured part of future development activity. Even though
ground transportation to Prudhoe Bay is now possible over the
pipeline haul road, and certain cargoes can be lifted by air,
the economics of the situation indusputably favors water
transport. The tug-barge combination will remain as the
primary mode for movement of bulk cargo in support of arctic
resource development [Refs. 40, 164].
Barge sealifts will again reach high tonnage levels as
nearshore Beaufort Sea exploration continues. Industry
planning envisions a lift of 170,000 tons during the summer
of 1983 or 1984, or possibly in both years [Ref . 172] ; the
capital investment of such an operation has been estimated as
follows [Ref. 164]:
170,000 tons at $1.5 million per 1000 tons $255
million 25 barges at $4.0 million each 100
million
25 barges at $4.0 million each 100 million
TOTAL $455 million
The size of such an investment is considerable, especially
when pitted against uncertain seasonal conditions and such a
tight time frame. This is perhaps the major drawback of tug
and barge transportation: it is very much a matter of having
all the eggs in one basket. The opportunity cost of a barge
convoy includes not only the risk of lost or damaged vessels
and cargo and the time value of the investment, but also the
possible loss of an entire working season [Ref. 164].
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Tug-barge transportation will also be called upon for for
support as development activities expand into the Douglas
Range, the National Petroleum Reserve, and the Bering Sea.
The latter area will afford easier and lengthier access to
marine transportation due to less strenuous ice conditions.
A second category of marine traffic will also support the
development effort in offshore areas. Workboats will service
drilling rigs during the ice free season, although
helicopters will undoubtedly be widely employed for this
purpose as well. The Energy Resources-E. G. Frankel
(ERCO/EGF) study of petroleum development impact estimated
workboat totals for continental shelf areas at 25, 70 and 120
for its pessimistic, optimistic and highly optimistic
scenarios, respectively [Ref. 48]. The volume of such
boating traffic depends directly on the level and timing of
offshore drilling.
B. TRANSPORTATION OF ENERGY PRODUCTS
Long distance, high volume transportation of oil and
natural gas has traditionally involved either the tank ship
or the pipeline. Selection between these two modes is
usually clear cut, since the latter is principally for
overland use and the other an overwater method. The
transportation decision for Prudhoe Bay was unusual in that
both modes, in specialized forms, were active possibilities.
It is noteworthy that the transportation system ultimately
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implemented involves both tankers and a pipeline.
The TAPS debate brought forth a lively discussion of
alternatives, including some outside the tanker-pipeline
tradition. Future arctic development will have a variety of
choices, as outlined below.
1 . Land-Based Modes
Potential arctic pipelines have at least one factor
in their favor: a functioning 800-mile prototype, winding
over a variety of arctic and sub-arctic terrain. Whatever
criticisms may have been levelled by opponents, whether eco-
nomic, aesthetic or environmental, it cannot be argued that
TAPS fails to move oil effectively. Whether another pipeline
could be built is open to question. The stormy birth of TAPS
also provides ample arguments against it. Although it seems
likely to be completed, at a cost of $40 billion, the natural
gas pipeline also faces serious obstacles [Ref. 169].
With TAPS operating at three-quarters of its designed
capacity, an additional pipeline or pipelines from the North
Slope would result only if production significantly passes
two million barrels per day. This economic sense is
reinforced by federal lease requirements mandating the use of
existing pipelines if they are available [Ref. 165].
Pipeline delivery of Bering Sea resources is an alternative,
though a far-fetched one. The brightest prospect for
additional pipelining in arctic Alaska is for feeder lines
connecting producing North Slope wells with TAPS.
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Transportation of crude oil by railroad is also a
possibility, but not a leading contender in the current
discourse. Extension of the Alaska Railroad to deliver oil
was studied and recommended by an independent consultant
during the TAPS decision process. A Canadian Transport
ministry report estimated that 360 locomotives and 11,000
tank cars would be needed to move two million barrels per day
through Canada to the continental United States [Ref . 3]
.
Building a railroad to the remote areas of development is
hardly less of an engineering feat that is pipeline
construction.
2. Icebreaking Tankers
The most glamorous of the marine transportation
systems, a fleet of strengthened high-powered tankers, again
arises as an alternative for moving arctic oil and gas. The
technology, though not yet in routine application, has been
tested and it is being actively developed for use in arctic
Canada (see Chapter VII) . Long, parallel-sided vessels with
properly designed bows have proven much more effective than
icebreakers so far built. The MANHATTAN proved the economic
and technological feasibility of arctic navigation by
tankers; however, as one study cautions, similar feasibility
of an arctic oil transportation system cannot be inferred
from this [Ref. 63],
The MANHATTAN voyages did gather valuable data, and
the study continues. The U. S. Maritime Commmission (MARAD)
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not unsurprisingly supports the concept, and is involved in a
number of projects related to the marine mode:
—a joint industry-government pilot project has been
proposed for building one or two icebreaking tankers or
liquified natural gas (LNG) carriers and an arctic terminal
[Ref. 57]
—a Memorandum of Agreement with the Canadian Marine
Transportation Administration was executed in 1980, providing
for data-sharing on arctic marine transportation systems
[Ref. 57].
— in conjunction with the Coast Guard, the state of
Alaska, and the Alaska Oil and Gas Association, MARAD has
conducted "traf f icability" studies using the POLAR-class
icebreakers to assess the feasibility of a "polar tanker"
design [Ref. 30, 31]; and in February 1981 POLAR SEA was
underway with the goal of a winter transit to Prudhoe Bay
[Ref. 167] . Phase IV of the program is a possible 1982
traverse of the Northwest Passage [Ref. 57].
—a study of various vessel systems to move crude oil,
LNG and methanol from NPR-A to the U. S. east and Gulf coasts
was conducted, using computer simulation of vessel
performances. The conclusions support the feasibility of
marine systems [Ref. 57]
.
—a 1979 MARAD report concluded that it would be
technically feasible and economically attractive, in
comparison with intercontinental pipelines, to transport
petroleum products from the North Slope to the U. S. east
coast by icebreaking tanker [Ref. 56]
.
The dimensions of the proposed vessels border on the
incredible. Demands of the operating environment require
great structural strength, 100,000 to 200,000 shaft
horsepower (SHP) for maneuverability and icebreaking ability,
and enormous size in the 150,000 to 300,000 deadweight ton
(dwt) range [Ref. 40]. The traf f icability studies postulate
an even larger tanker: 1200 feet in length, 371,000 dwt,
210,000 SHP and an 80-foot draft. Such a ship would be
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capable of year-round operation from Unimak Pass to the
Arctic Circle. Bering Sea operations would be possible with
even less power [Ref . 30, 31]
.
As the concept is applied to arctic Alaska, two
routes are possible. The Bering Strait-Unimak Pass corridor
appears to offer less resistance, and obviously so for
production from the Bering Sea; the Northwest Passage is much
longer and more demanding [Ref. 29] . A Canadian analysis of
ice data found the "western" route to be more unpredictable
due to dynamics of the ice pack, but even so projected that
no significant hindrance would result in nine years out of
ten. Extreme conditions would involve only two to five days'
delay [Ref. 78] . This analysis, however, assumes that
vessels would have to round Point Barrow in deep water well
to the north and fight the arctic, ice pack. Arctic Ocean
conditions feature hard multiyear ice and pressure ridging
from the moving pack. Bering Sea conditions are far less
demanding
.
The Northwest Passage's most attractive feature,
however, involves the distribution of demand. The eastern
seaboard faces the greatest shortfall in oil. The length and
rigors of the Northwest Passage thus become less preclusive





Icebreaking Tug and Barge Combinations
This alternative exists as an extension of the North
Slope's current "workhorse" of marine transportation.
Crowley Maritime has 30 9000 horsepower tugs and three
icebreaking barges employed in Alaska operations. The barges
are pushed by one or two tugs in stern notches, and have
navigated in ice up to six feet thick [Ref. 172]. The
concept is readily applicable to crude oil transport, where
suitable tug horsepower and the weight of an oil-laden barge
would provide reasonable icebreaking capability. Such a
system would be cheaper and more flexible that a fleet of
icebreaking tankers by separating the propulsion from the
cargo tanks: barges, for example, could be filled at
production areas and retrieved as necessary by tugs. The
major drawback is that lacking the rigid construction of a
single ship, a tug-barge combination could not operate in ice
conditions as demanding.
4. Submarines
One of the more exotic alternatives, yet intriguingly
close to technological feasibility, the use of tanker
submarines was proposed during the Prudhoe Bay development.
The Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics proposed a
fleet of 300,000 dwt nuclear submarines, each carrying 1.2
million barrels of crude oil. They would transit beneath the
arctic ice pack from Prudhoe Bay to the Atlantic coast [Ref.
83]. A MARAD study found 400,000 ton submarines, each 15-20
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times the size of the Navy's Trident, to be highly
competitive with pipelines or icebreaking tankers [Ref . 83]
.
Another study found a 170,000 to 250,000 dwt submarine
"practical and reliable" for delivery to east coast ports,
with lower transportation costs [Ref. 63]
.
Attractive as this may sound, submarine oil transport
would entail even greater degrees of technological risk than
icebreaking tanker development. Though virtually negating
the problem of ice navigation, such a project must face the
nuclear energy controversy. Submarines of the size proposed
have never been built and would certainly be more expensive
than surface shipping.
5. Surface Effect Vehicles
Surface effect, or air cushion, vehicles (SEV) offer
another non-traditional approach to the transportation
problem. Feasibility studies extrapolated a 10,000 ton
tanker vehicle design from operational models under 300 tons,
and evaluated it as a solution for Prudhoe petroleum
transport [Refs. 54, 55]. The system envisioned would entail
a number of SEV tankers ferrying oil to a specially outfitted
tanker, a floating port that would move with the seasonal
advance and retreat of ice; the cargo would then be
transferred into conventional tank vessels for the open water
journey. The advantages unique to such an arrangement would
be a 60 knot speed and the ability to easily traverse water,
ice or land without hindrance. With each SEV seasonally
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averaging 0.7 to 5.6 round trips per day, it was estimated
that Prudhoe output could be handled by 28 vehicles. This
would result in the same transportation cost per barrel as
TAPS, but with one-third the capital investment [Ref . 54]
.
The feasibility of a surface effect route through the
Northwest Passage was also evaluated [Ref. 55].
SEV transport of oil is limited by the high fuel
consumption and the operational difficulty of traversing
pressure ridges in the ice. It has been estimated that to
avoid impassable ridging would require "meandering" up to
four times the straight line distance to be travelled [Ref.
53] . This renders the SEV alternative seriously deficient.
6. Marine Transportation Support
It is tempting to see marine transportation systems
as a collection of more or less exotic vessels or vehicles.
The less glamorous side, however, involves an extensive set
of support sub-systems that will enable a marine
transportation system to function in an arctic environment.
A crude oil loading terminal, for example, would
involve heavy capital expenditures and would be a particular
problem in the shallow water of the North Slope. A marine
terminal would need mooring facilities, storage capacity,
provisions for ballast treatment, fueling arangements, safety
equipment and personnel facilities as a minimum. A
conceptual design has been done for a bottom-founded Beaufort
Sea terminal, 4.9 miles offshore in 120 feet of water, with a
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5.2 million barrel storage capacity. It would be operational
10-11 months of the year, being shut down when ice prevents
tanker mooring [Refs. 36, 57]. A terminal for submarines
would involve even greater complexities, especially if
underwater loading were to be a feature.
A project more suited to near term use involves
development of Nome as a deepwater port. In November 1980
the city passed a bond issue supporting a state-financed
$70.4 million facility; it would consist of a 3600 foot
causeway to provide 22 feet of water at the dock. With a
1983-84 completion target, the port would support land based
mineral extraction, offshore drilling activity and general
cargo handling. It is an example of how Alaska's oil revenue
may be used, since income generated by the facility will
cover only operation and maintenance costs with no capital
recovery [Ref. 73],
Other necessary support functions, many of which
involve government agencies, include:
—bathymetry work, since bottom depth information is
inadequate in the Bering Sea and arctic coastal areas [Ref.
41], For example, a number of pinnacles have been discovered
in recent years in Viscount Melville Sound which would be
major hazards to marine transportation. This bathymetry
problem is especially important for large draft-constrained
vessels that must navigate close inshore to avoid ice.
—navigation systems. Satellite navigation is available
and the Bering Sea has Loran-C coverage, but local shore-
based aids will be needed.
—communication systems, which will require upgrading.
Long range frequencies are often unreliable due to
atmospheric conditions where short range VHF-FM
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communications are not impaired [Ref. 40]. A VHF-FM net
would require an extensive new system of transmitting
stations or remote transmitters.
--pollution response capability. This would be a certain
requirement since the potential damage of spilled oil is very
high. Again, the TAPS experience sets a precedent in
requiring the industry to maintain extensive prevention,
containment and cleanup capabilities.
—search and rescue forces, filling a definite need in
the adverse arctic marine environment.
—a weather and ice information system, which would be
one of the most important elements. Arctic vessels need both
long range and localized ice information, and timely
promulgation can greatly enhance vessel movement. The Naval
Fleet Weather Facility now handles ice prognostication. By
the end of 1981 a much- improved ice dynamics model [Ref. 89]
will be used in ice forecasting, greatly improving the semi-
empirical model employed since 1968 [Ref. 175]. The National
Weather Service would undoubtedly assume the ice forecasting
function as a statutory responsibility when extensive
commercial need arises [Ref. 41] . Ice forecasting projects
such as the 1975-76 Arctic Ice Dynamics Joint Experiment
(AIDJEX) have been performed. But improved data collection
and forecasting, perhaps utilizing impulse radar, satellite
sensors and side-looking airborne radar would also be needed
[Ref. 40] . A requirement for more weather data could also be
expected.
—traffic control and monitoring. The environmental
sensitivity of petroleum transportation could be reflected in
a requirement for a traffic system, much as one was required
for TAPS tankers in Prince William Sound. Loran-C
retransmission (where an electronic positioning signal is
received by a vessel and retransmitted to a control center)
offers a cost effective means of monitoring vessel positions.
Navigation, communications, search and rescue, and weather
and ice information could all be combined, with the control
function, in a single system.
C. BY LAND OR BY SEA: THE TRANSPORTATION DECISION
In the most general sense, the transportation decision
for future Alaskan energy resources will involve a choice
between land-based and marine transportation systems. From
the standpoint of technology and risk involved in applying
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it, the issue can be further refined into a choice between
new pipelines, and the introduction of a marine system (or
systems)
.
Pipeline transportation has the following characterictics
[Ref. 165]:
—high cost of construction in extreme conditions.
—great environmental impact, but little risk of further
degradation once constructed.
—geographic inflexibility for input and output, and a
limited economic range of volume.
—utilization of proven technology.
—high likelihood and ample precedent for opposition from
a number of quarters.
In contrast, a marine transportation system can be described
as follows [Ref. 40]:
—a lower economic threshold needed for production.
—great flexibility in departure and arrival points, and
the ability to transship (e. g. , transfer of cargo from
specialized ice capable vessels to less expensive tankers)
.
—unlimited incremental expansion of volume.
—vessel construction in temperate climates, though with
legal constraints requiring that cargo between U. S. ports be
carried in U. S. built, U. S. flag vessels.
—a requirement for expensive and technologically
unproven North Slope terminal facilities.
—sovereignty problems, for delivery to the Atlantic
coast.
—substantial environmental risk during operation.
—problems with maintaining uniform flow, subject to the
vagaries of weather, ice and seasonal conditions.
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In addition to these factors, utilization of pipelines or
marine systems is dependent on the geography of development.
The Bering Sea areas seem ill-suited for pipeline transport
and are attractive prospects for a marine system. New
capacity will become necessary for North Slope production
only if a surge of new oil materializes; TAPS can carry
500,000 additional barrels a day. As previously mentioned,
feeder pipelines may be employed as production expands
outward from the existing field. The Chukchi Sea will
require marine transport, either for the entire journey or to
feed it into TAPS.
The future of marine transportation is a bright one. It
is supported by the Department of Energy and MARAD [Ref.
165] , and much of the front-end risk of developing new arctic
marine systems is being borne by Canadian firms. As
petroleum development activities expand outward from their
"cradle" at Prudhoe Bay, the marine mode will be examined
more closely. The relationship between transportation and
development also functions in the opposite direction: the
availability of feasible marine alternatives will make some
lease areas more attractive for production.
Building on the development forecast sketched at the end
of Chapter IV, the following events seem probable:
—production from the North Slope will not exceed two
million barrels per day before 2000. New production from the
National Petroleum Reserve, Douglas Wildlife Range or the
Beaufort Sea will come on stream as Prudhoe production
declines, and additional oil will bring TAPS up to full
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capacity. While producible reserves may be be available by
the early 1990s to surpass TAPS' capacity, the increment will
not justify an additional transportation system.
—The Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System will be
completed by the late 1980s. It will carry all natural gas
from the North Slope.
—there will be no other major pipelines built for
primary transportation of petroleum [Ref. 161]. New
development of North Slope reserves may necessitate feeder
lines to TAPS. The gas line now under construction and TAPS
perhaps represent the zenith of large scale overland
pipelines in this country.
— the Bering Sea areas and the Chukchi Sea will utilize
marine systems, if and when they are developed. The success
of Canadian arctic transportation will especially be a factor
in speeding or retarding the development process. Bristol
Bay, as the most likely candidate for initial production,
will depend on a marine system; icebreaking tug and barge
combinations transferring oil to ocean-going tankers in the
Aleutians offer an attractive method. Chukchi Sea transpor-
tation, although not expected in this century, will rely on
icebreaking tankers.
—as discussed previously, tug and barge support traffic
will reach substantial levels in 1983-84, and continue at
fairly high tonnages as exploration and production activities
continue. The level and timing of transportation buildups
will be directly dependent on the pace of development
activity, and will precede the production phase by several
years. With sequential development similar to that
illustrated in Figure 4-3, summer tug and barge traffic
should continue with fairly high tonnage levels in the years
following the Beaufort Sea lift.
—small boat traffic in offshore development areas will
be directly proportional to the installation of drilling
rigs.
Predicting the future of energy-related transportation,
though it relies on the assumptions of energy development, is
to some degree easier than energy forecasting. While the
extent of producible oil and gas reserves are sketchy at
best, and the combination of national and international
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events affecting the oil industry are guesswork, arctic
transportation alternatives are more clear cut. In general,
marine transportation seems to offer the more attractive
solution for support logistics and for moving the commodity.
One aspect of this attractiveness has been alluded to:




VI. CONCERNS FOR THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
"Environmental ism" is a rather recent addition to modern
English. Moreover, the term is used loosely and is more a
collection of connotations than a precise noun. It is used
here to denote a concern not only for the land, flora and
fauna in their natural states, but also for the established
way of life and culture of certain social groups.
Environmentalism can perhaps be viewed as the voice of the
status quo inasmuch as it pertains to preserving systemic
balance. The social context is less widely recognized, but
it is an item usually required in environmental statements to
ensure it is considered.
Environmentalism played such a central role in the
development of Prudhoe Bay that a similar substantial impact
is assured for any future oil and gas development in Alaska.
It has, in fact, been involved in an ongoing debate that has
recently reached a momentary lull with passage of an Alaska
Lands Bill. The future influence of environmentalism will be
felt on both of two issues already discussed: the pace and
scope of energy development, and the transportation alterna-
tives for moving oil and gas. Chapter IX will bring these
relationships together in a more comprehensive manner.
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A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING IN ALASKA
Spawned in the political turmoil of the 1960s,
environmental consciousness came to particularly focus on
crude oil when the tanker TORREY CANYON grounded on Seven
Stones Reef in March 1967. The disastrous spill from this
vessel was followed by a number of other tanker incidents and
the demand for action reached a crescendo with an oil rig
blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel in January 1969. The
National Environmental Policy Act was passed the same year,
the Environmental Protection Agency was formed in 1970 [Ref.
2] , and subsequent legislation deeply involved the Coast
Guard in marine environmental protection.
As has been mentioned previously, the TAPS debate
centered to a large degree on transportation. Development of
the Prudhoe Bay reserves was absolutely opposed in some
quarters, but the political skirmishing largely involved the
merits of oil transportation alternatives. The choice of an
overland pipeline forced an immediate settlement of native
land issues; and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of
1971 included an innocuous 130-word paragraph which has
become the vortex of what the Sierra Club labelled the
"environmental battle of the century" [Ref. 94] . Section
17(d)(2) of the Act contained conservation provisions, among
them an instruction to the Secretary of the Interior to
choose for preservation 80 million acres from the public
domain in Alaska "of sufficient interest to its national
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owners" [Ref. 15]. These new national parks, wild rivers,
wildlife refuges, and national forests were to be formed
within seven years. In May 1978 a House-passed "d-2" bill
failed in the Senate due to the threat of filibuster by
Alaskans Senator Mike Gravel. With the December 18 deadline
nearing, Secretary Andrus, with White House backing, withdrew
56 million acres under the 1906 Antiquities Act and another
54 million acres of wildlife refuges. This move doubled the
size of the national park system [Ref. 94].
During this process, the mood in Alaska grew steadily
more hostile to the federal action. Most Alaskans cannot be
described as environmentalists in the Sierra Club tradition,
and the maneuvers in far-off Washington seemed high-handed
and arbitrary. There was a real fear of exclusion from the
land, that long established rights of hunting, fishing and
access would be lost by Washington v s "lockup" of vast tracts,
and that reasonable development of the state would be
prevented.
In February 1980 the Senate again deferred the question.
Andrus then withdrew another 40 million acres of wildlife
refuges and put 12 million under temporary protection [Ref.
102], However, on November 12 of the same year, a Senate
bill was passed by the House and signed by President Carter.
It contained the following provisons [Ref. 97]
:
—added 43.6 million acres to the naional park system,
doubling it in size.
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—doubled wildlife refuge acreage by adding 53.8 million
acres.
—tripled the national wilderness preservation system
with 56.7 million acres.
—added 13 new wild and scenic rivers.
—speeded conveyance of 105 million and 44 million acres
to the state and to natives, respectively.
—permitted limited oil and gas exploration activities on
the William 0. Douglas Arctic Wildlife Range.
Like the Pipeline Authorization Act, the Alaska National
Interest Lands Bill is very much a compromise measure. The
Alaska Coaliton, an alliance of 52 environmental groups,
supported the legislation, but has identified "corrections"
to be sought in 1981 [Ref . Ill] . The forces of development
are also unsatisfied. Exploration on the Douglas Wildlife
Range, although allowed by the bill, is felt to be too
restricted for the promise of this area; and some 154 million
acres, or 41 per cent of the state, are further closed to
normal oil and gas activity. Further legislative efforts on
these items is also planned [Ref. 97]
.
While not completely resolving the problem of Alaska land
use, the recent legislation at least provides a starting
point for future debate about oil and gas development. Even
so, the permissibility of oil and gas activities on the
various land units will be the subject of debate. The
industry will undoubtedly seek the broadest possible leeway
for exploration; environmental groups will attempt to
constrain oil and gas activity as much as possible. The
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National Interests Lands Bill at least provides some starting
rules.
Often overlooked in the development-conservation tug of
war is the viewpoint of Alaska citizens. There is a great
deal of ambivalence involved. Individuals, their state
government and the local economy have benefited greatly from
Prudhoe oil development, so much so that even by 1977 the
state's per capita income was the nation's highest and 51 per
cent above the national average. But there is also a concern
for the uniqueness of Alaskan life. The 1974 election of Jay
Hammond as governor represented hesitation about development
[Ref . 15] , and was reaffirmed by his defeat in 1978 of pro-
development Wally Hickel. Yet 1980 brought the election of
Frank H. Murkowski to the U.S. Senate, a man backed by out of
state oil and business interests, to replace the more liberal
Mike Gravel [Ref. 148], Alaskans, as a group tend to be
suspicious of oil companies, of "lower 48" environmental
groups, and of the federal government. As a bumper sticker
bluntly phrases it, "We Don't Give a Damn How They Do It On
The Outside" [Ref. 94].
B. THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
For all of their inhospitality to the human race, the
arctic regions are remarkable for their extreme fragility.
Few human activities are more threatening to arctic natural
systems than is oil and gas development. Oil industry
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accidents will have a much greater effect on biota, land and
water in the Alaskan arctic then elsewhere. This is due to
weather conditions, geologic characteristics and biological
susceptibility [Ref . 68]
.
Tundra, which comprises the land areas of the North
Slope, is marked by extremely slow regeneration of any
disturbance. Frozen in winter, the soil surface layer
becomes wet and marshy in summer. Experience shows the
principal environmental problems of oil and gas development
stem from construction and overland transportation; bulldozer
trails, for example, virtually become canals [Ref. 51]. One
of the worst demonstrations of the tundra's fragility
occurred in the 1960s when a Geophysical Service Incorporated
bulldozer operator carved "GSI" and an arrow in letters 200
feet high. Thermokarst, or thermal erosion of the
permafrost, was followed by slumpage, and now the scars are
ponds eight feet deep [Ref. 15]
.
Technique can greatly reduce impact. Tundra damage is
minimized by use of snow and ice roads in winter and with
special tires for vehicles. Sand or gravel pads are
necessary for construction areas such as drill sites.
Careful avoidance of fuel spills and removal of waste are
commonsense practices neglected in the past. One Geological
Survey program in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska




Water areas are greatly affected by gravel dredging,
although the severity of this type of bottom rearrangement is
questionable. Much more threatening is the possibility of
spilled oil in the cold and frequently ice-covered water.
The problems include:
—oil spilled in the Arctic Ocean will be circulated by
the Beaufort Gyral Stream over large areas.
—arctic conditons, such as low water temperatures and
reduced wind fetch, will provide little weathering or
dispersion for spilled oil. This will compound the
possibility of environmental damage [Ref . 155]
.
—beside hindering clean-up efforts, ice and weather
conditions could preclude the drilling of a relief well in
cases of a blowout [Ref. 155].
—once trapped under ice for a season, oil will migrate
upward through brine channels in the spring. On the ice
surface, the dark color will accelerate melting. A large
arctic spill could cause tremendous artificial melting of
ice, and the long term effects of this, though not proven,
could involve climate changes and an upset of the global heat
balance [Ref. 17]
.
The Coast Guard has conducted a number of studies [Refs.
32, 43, 63] to identify the effects of oil spills and assess
cleanup methods, and other extensive research has been done
both in this country and abroad. On the whole, equipment and
knowledge do not appear to be at a stage of maturity
necessary for adequately handling a large arctic spill.
The effect of development activity on wildlife probably
qualifies as the most hotly contested environmental issue.
An ARCO study conducted from 19 69 to 1979 found the
development around Prudhoe Bay to have had no effect on
wildlife: caribou and snow geese both maintained stable
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populations [Ref . 115] . Nonetheless, there is real concern
that as activity expands, wildlife will inevitably suffer.
The many species inhabiting or visiting the Douglas Wildlife
Range and bowhead whales in the Beaufort Sea are directly in
the path of progress.
The arctic is biologically important because many of the
indigenous and transient ecosystems have global significance.
Disruption of special areas or conditions unique to the arc-
tic could seriously affect ecosystems in other parts of the
world. As an example, high nutrient areas support hundreds
of thousands of animals and birds during breeding seasons or
at a vital stage of long-ranging migrations [Ref. 81].
Even the presence of unnatural sound can adversely affect
wildlife. Research indicates that marine mammals rely
exclusively on auditory sensations for long range orientation
and communication. A large tanker could raise ambient noise
levels by 40 decibels at 100 kilometers. Little conclusive
data exists, but this could seriously disrupt the lives of a
variety of marine mammal species [Ref. 96]
.
The problem is exacerbated by a lack of reliable
information. It is dificult to make intelligent choices
concerning environmental-development tradeoffs when little is
known of natural ecosystems and the effect that certain
activities will have. But the interest in developement of
Alaska has prompted much new research. The National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has, for example, an
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ongoing outer continental shelf environmental assessment
program, which has been expanded to the Bering Sea at Bureau
of Land Management request. The objective of the program is
to develop information and data bases on biological,
physical, chemical and geological processes; this will
improve ability to assess and predict the impact of oil and
gas development. Of especial interest are [Ref . 28]
:
—pollutant effects
—naturally occurring oil seeps, which are estimated to
account for ten per cent of all marine hydrocarbons. Marine
transportation introduces 35 per cent, offshore oil activity
1.3 per cent, and the remainder comes from runofff, fallout
and coastal facilities.
—hazards imposed by the environment on petroleum
exploration and development activity.
It is clear, as one Canadian report phrases it, that
"research results and data alone are not enough to define
policy; but good policies for resource management cannot be
developed in the absence of knowledge" [Ref. 81] . The
adequacy of the current body of information is, of course,
subject to debate. The choices would be difficult ones even
with perfect knowledge of cause and effect relationships.
C. SOCIAL AND NATIVE CONCERNS
Leading a tough and remote existence with few interests
that coincided with those of civilization, Alaska's natives
were largely ignored until the Second World War. Most of the
various native cultures had no concept of land ownership, but
claims began to be heard in the 1960s as natives saw acreage
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pass to state control and for geologic exploration [Ref . 15]
.
Native groups found sympathy in federal courts and in the
higher levels of the Interior Department. The 1971 Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act has been previously cited and
was truly a piece of landmark legislation. The effects
included [Ref. 15] :
—transfer of 40 million acres and $1 billion to natives.
—opening the way for TAPS and Prudhoe Bay development.
—conservation measures that sparked the ten-year Alaska
lands battle.
—changing forever the status and structure of native
societies, by instituting a system of native corporations as
vehicles for political power and tangible wealth.
The twelve native corporations are oriented along
geographic and ethnic lines, with a thirteenth for natives
residing outside of Alaska. These organizations wield real
power. With the resources to buy first-rate financial and
legal expertise, the corporations have invested both in and
out of the state. Yet alongside the demands for economic
participation in Alaska, there is also a strong force for
preservation of traditional culture and values [Ref. 15]
.
Civilization has brought many conveniences to the native
in the "bush," but these have been accompanied by the scourge
of alcoholism and have fostered dependence and alienation. A
return to older ways, or even a synthesis of traditional and
western values, will in one respect be manifested as a desire
to ensure long term integrity of the land and wildlife.
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This trend is perhaps best exemplified by attempts of the
North Slope borough to restrict certain areas for subsistence
use only (see Chapter IV) . How sucessful the borough's 5000
inhabitants, mostly natives [Ref. 126], will be is in
question.
Those involved in commercial fishing also find
threatening aspects to energy development. A great deal of
fishing in Alaska is done from small family-owned boats, with
a substantial investment risked each year on the vagaries of
the catch. Fishermen are generally opposed to marine aspects
of the oil industry; this concern has been reflected in the
past as TAPS tanker restrictions in Prince William Sound and
the withholding of Bristol Bay tracts from lease.
Natives are not the only Alaskans who subsist on the
land. The vastness of the state embraces many people who,
for various reasons, have sought a wilderness lifestyle and
live primarily by subsistence activities such as trapping,
fishing and hunting. Many lived for years on the public
domain before the land was classified into "use" categories,
and it is these "squatters" who are most threatened by recent
events in Alaska. With much of the land now parcelled into
parks, refuges and wilderness, or in the process of transfer
to state and native control, many people are finding their
living arrangements in violation of the law. Unlike the
natives, these people have no organizations to represent and
protect them. But their ideals are shared by many Alaskans,
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most of whom are involved to some degree with wilderness
activites even if they do not take their livelihood directly
from it. There is, therefore, a significant political force
that will oppose development activity insofar as it is
perceived as being destructive of certain ways of life.
"Social" environmentalism cannot be separated from
"natural" environmentalism. Many of Alaska's inhabitants
depend heavily on the stability of natural ecosystems,
whether for economic, cultural or recreational reasons.
Disruption of these systems or the natural setting in which
they exist would seriously affect the local economy and
social structure [Ref . 81] . The rights of those living close
to the land or the sea will have to be accounted for in
development decision making.
D. ENVIRONMENTALISM AS A COUNTERFORCE TO DEVELOPMENT
The development of Prudhoe Bay and the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline were an introduction to subtle changes in America's
collective notion of "progress;" the level of opposition and
the arguments hurled at TAPS were new, and undoubtedly would
not have been issues 20 years before. The environmental
viewpoint is generally seen as a "yes, but ... " approach, a
negative restraint on human endeavor. It will act in much




The nature of the conflict will not be a simple
conservation-development dichotomy. Instead, it can be
better characterized as the interaction of a triad of
interests, representing
--development: the commercial interests of the oil
industry with the backing of like-minded Alaskan individuals
and organizations.
—conservation: national environmental groups, mostly
from outside Alaska.
— local use: natives, "subsistence" Alaskans, and others
depending directly on the natural environment.
The sides and positions in this three-way contest are
fluctuating. The Sierra Club has expressed satisfaction with
the environmental features of TAPS since it has been in
operation. Many of the native corporations are involved in
enterprises that stand to gain from further development in
Alaska, and some are partners in oil and gas development
itself. Three corporations have joined VECO, Inc., to
produce the first Alaskan-built drilling rig [Ref. 100], and
some December 1979 Bering Sea leases are owned jointly by
native groups and oil companies.
Notably absent from the triad of interests is government.
Federal agencies are spread across the spectrum. Land
management organizations, for example, range from the Park
Service which is dedicated to the ideal of preserving land as
it is, to the Fish and Wildlife Service which travels a
middle road seeking compatible use, to active support of
economic exploitation by the Forest Service and Bureau of
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Land Management [Ref. 15]. The Alaska state government is
similarly fractionated as it attempts to represent the
diversity of interests within the state.
Development will inevitably mean disturbance of the
natural environment to some degree [Ref. 51]. Operations on
the tundra demonstrate this; and it has been estimated that
for every one million barrels of oil produced in the Beaufort
Sea, two hundred barrels will be spilled into the water [Ref.
93]. For this reason, the environmental side will always
have an edge, the benefit of doubt. Resources preserved in
their natural state can always be developed in the future,
but once developed the process can rarely be satsfactor ily
reversed
.
In summary, environmental concerns will influence the
future of arctic Alaska in the following ways:
--the choices will not be clear cut selections between
virgin wilderness and the ravages of all-out development.
Instead, the outcome will be one of compromise along the
lines of the TAPS model. Environmental groups will not seek
(or be able) to stop development, in recognition of the
overall energy reality.
--environmental concerns will act as a restraint on
development actvities by insisting on the use of minimally
destructive methods and inclusion of adequate safeguards in
projects. Again, this follows the TAPS precedent. In
addition, there will be a thrust to limit the scope of
development in areas of special circumstances, using the
framework of recent Alaska lands legislation.
— following precedent, a principal tactic will be the use
of lawsuits to stop development, slow it down or effect
compromises
.
—development of the Bering Sea and Chukchi Sea offshore
tracts and the deeper Beaufort Sea waters will face more
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restraints from technological and logistic problems than from
environmental pressure. Bristol Bay will be the exception in
these areas.
— environmental forces will strongly resist development
of the Douglas Wildlife Range and Bristol Bay, but in the end
will succeed in limiting and modifying development activity
rather than preventing it in these areas.
Environmental advocacy is brought into the decision
process as a required part of environmental statements; this
ensures that concerns of the social and natural environment
are at least recognized. Somehow, the political system must
decide on relative values: whether a barrel of oil from the
Alaskan arctic is worth incremental disruption of existing
social and ecological systems, and whether that barrel of oil
has greater value now or in the future. The choices are long
term, complex and uncertain.
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VII. CANADIAN ARCTIC DEVELOPMENTS
For all the prospects, potential and optimism that
surrounds oil and gas development in arctic Alaska, the
setting is a rather tame one compared to events unfolding in
the Canadian arctic. Canada's 80 degree arc of arctic
frontage is second only to that of the Soviet Union. Over
the past two decades there has been a growing awareness of
the once-ignored northern lands by both the Canadian
government and the private sector. Development of Prudhoe
Bay stimulated exploration on the other side of the border,
and the pace of activity now underway in Canada may well have
a similar accelerative effect on American arctic efforts.
The importance of arctic marine transportation has long
been recognized as key to development of Canada's
inaccessible northern territories. A sizeable, though not
overwhelming icebreaker fleet is maintained by the Canadian
Coast Guard, as shown in Table 8-1. Commercial transport
was greatly advanced by the 1978 completion of MV ARCTIC, a
28,000 deadweight ton class II icebreaking freighter. Built
with substantial government assistance at a cost of $38
million, the ARCTIC is intended for high latitude use from
June through November. This will be supplemented by cargo
carriage in the Great Lakes, occasional voyages to Europe,





[Ref. 141]. The ARCTIC is also used in transporting lead and
zinc ore from the Strathcona mine on Baffin Island, and is
guaranteed half of the output from similar mining scheduled
to begin on Little Cornwallis Island in 1982 [Ref. 140].
Canada's first significant attempt at arctic commercial
shipping will undoubtedly find ample work [Ref. 147] . It
will also break the ice, both literally and figuratively, for
more ambitious transportation technologies.
Canadian arctic development projects planned or in
motion, and their potential influence, are described in the
following sections.
A. DOME PETROLEUM AMD THE BEAUFORT SEA
Occupying a premier position in arctic energy
development, Dome Petroleum Ltd is a 30-year old company and
the largest oil and gas landholder in Canada [Ref. 46] . Dome
drilled its first well in the high arctic in 1961 [Ref. 44].
With 1979 revenues of $804 million and $154 million in net
income [Ref. 151], the company was about 50 per cent Canadian
held in December 1980 [Ref. 87], As a publicly traded
corporation, ownership fluctuates; the significance of
Canadian control in an increasingly nationalistic political
setting will be discussed later in the chapter.
While involved in numerous geographic areas, Dome's
primary arctic venture is in the Canadian sector of the
Beaufort Sea. The company estimates that 30-40 billion
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barrels of oil and 250-320 trillion cubic feet of gas lie in
the Beaufort-Mackenzie Delta structural traps [Ref. 105]
,
with a 25 per cent chance of a 70 billion barrel oil
potential [Ref. 118]. The president of the company has
predicted that half of Canada's oil will come from the
Beaufort by 1990 [Ref. 108]. Annual drilling expenditures
are in the $150-200 million range [Ref. 118], There have
been encouraging successes: oil or gas has been found in all
of eight wells drilled to 6000 feet [Ref. 151].
Dome plans to begin production by 1985, and have 1.5
million barrels per day (equal to current Prudhoe Bay
production) flowing by 1995 [Ref. 108]. To achieve this,
however, some severe technological obstacles must be
surmounted. Much of Dome's activity is in the shear zone, or
area of seasonal ice formation, which is marked by dynamic
and rapidly deforming ice conditions [Ref. 155]. The
Beaufort Sea bottom is ice-scoured to a depth of 130 feet,
the permafrost is discontinuous, and the sedimentary bottom
is unstable [Ref. 17], Additionally, Beaufort Sea oil
deposits are probably in small pools [Ref. 76]. There is
avid curiosity about the type of production facilities the
company will use in the ice-wracked Beaufort. Reinforced
sand and clay "atolls" may be built in 200 feet of water; the
first will take three or four summers to build and cost $1
billion [Ref. 151]. One possible alternative is the use of
monocone platforms capable of withstanding the forces of ice
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in water 150 to 250 feet deep. The structure rests on the
bottom, and has curved sides which force the ice to bend
upward and break [Ref. 76] . Moveable concrete or steel
caissons for storage are also under consideration [Ref. 1051.
Dome is not revealing its exact plans, except that the
operation will be monstrously expensive. An independent
source estimated that drilling costs per foot from an
artificial island will be 10-15 times the cost of a typical
conventional well in Alberta; and from a drillship will be
over 40 times as much [Ref. 76]. To get two billion barrels
of oil from the Kopanoar field alone will require an
investment of $5 billion [Ref. 151]. Nonetheless, there is
some evidence— subject to the errors of est imat ion--that
Beaufort Sea oil can be delilvered to southern Canada at
costs equal to or below those of imported oil at its 1980
price [Ref . 76] .
Transportation represents an even more intriguing techno-
logical hurdle. Dome plans to move its extracted crude oil
with a pair of 200,000 deadweight ton class X icebreaking
tankers [Ref. 105], each with 150,000 shaft horsepower [Ref.
78]. To contribute to the design of these vessels and prove
the feasibility of year-round operation [Ref. 14"7 ] , Dome has
embarked on a research program centered around the CANMAR






--300 feet in length, overall.
--16,400 shaft horsepower to a single propeller.
--a spoon-shaped bow to minimize icebreaking energy loss.
— a mid body reamer, providing better turning capability.
—bow and stern thrusters for maneuverability.
— a water spray system on the bow to provide lubrication.
Constructed in nine months, the KIGORIAK attempted for her
first voyage to make a particularly challenging late season
transit of the Northwest Passage as 1979 drew to a close.
Her performance exceeded expectations. It was especially
notable since the Canadian Coast Guard's new R-class
icebreaker, the FRANKLIN, also on her maiden voyage, lost all
the blades on one propeller and became beset in Viscount
Melville Sound; FRANKLIN and the assisting ST LAURENT had to
return to eastern Canada via the Panama Canal [Ref. 147]. It
was, to the Canadian government, an embarrassing comparison
of public and private icebreaker capabilities.
Dome currently owns 17 other ice-capable vessels,
including four drillships [Ref. 105]. It is also developing
a "swivelship ," able to rotate as it encounters passing ice,
without disrupting the drill string. The cost of such a
vessel will probably be about $100 million [Ref. 1511.
The company appears to be proceeding energetically toward
development of an arctic marine transportation system. A
recent announcement outlined plans for a $250 million
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shipyard, to be built for construction of ice-strengthened
ships. Conventional liquified natural gas (LNG) carriers
will be produced initially, with construction of Beaufort Sea
tankers to follow [Ref. 156].
Dome Petroleum seems determined to see oil flowing from
the Beaufort Sea. Its success in the endeavor will represent
a quantum leap in the technology of arctic hydrocarbon
development. More worrisome than the engineering problems,
however, are shifting political winds in Ottawa. As will be
discussed in the third section of this chapter, government
controlled oil prices and tax policy are the real keys to
Dome's success in the Beaufort.
B. ENERGY IN THE ARCTIC ISLANDS
Geographically, the higher latitudes of the Canadian
arctic consist of an extensive archipelago, laced with
waterways that are covered with ice much of the year. The
forbidding surface conceals a subterranean geology that is
attractive prospecting territory for oil and gas. While Dome
pursues oil in the Beaufort Sea, significant energy
development movements are also underway in the high arctic.
Panarctic Oils Ltd, 45 per cent government owned [Ref.
95], is perhaps foremost in island exploration technique.
The company estimates that 60 trillion cubic feet of gas can
be proved in the arctic islands [Ref. 105]. Its Drake F-76
well, completed in April 1978, was the first arctic offshore
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well to produce gas in commercial quantities [Ref . 144] . A
Panarctic specialty is the use of ice floes for drilling. 22
ice platforms have been built up with pumped water; they
require reasonable stability of the ice sheet, but rollers
allow lateral movement of the derrick up to 4.5 meters [Ref.
85] . Panarctic has improved the technique by use of urethane
blocks to reduce weight on the floe and speed construction
[Ref. 145], Flowlines to shore are buried to afford
protection from ice scour [Ref. 144], In water 55 to 400
meters deep, the ice platform approach has shown itself to be
the least expensive alternative [Ref. 85].
Panarctic is the lead company in the Arctic Island
Exploration Group which was formed in 1976. Other partners
include Esso Resources Canada, Gulf Oil of Canada and Petro-
Canada (with an 18 per cent share) . The purpose is to
acquire oil and gas rights in the Sverdrup Basin, a 500,000
square mile geologic area which includes much of the Canadian
archipelago. Panarctic and its partners had spent $180 mil-
lion on seismic work and drilling by early 1980 [Ref. .105],
The most ambitious high arctic undertaking is the Arctic
Pilot Project, a joint effort which includes state-owned
Petro-Canada (with a 37.5 per cent share), Dome Petroleum (20
per cent), as well as Nova, Melville Shipping, and Alberta
Gas Trunkline Company [Ref. 136]. The project touches almost
every aspect of arctic oil and gas development: drilling,
pipeline construction and employment of a fleet of
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icebreaking tank vessels. The purpose is to test the
economic and technological feasibility of energy development
and the marine mode of transportation, at the minimum scale
necessary to prove it [Ref. 65].
Gas will be extracted from eight wells at Drake Point on
Melville Island [Ref. 105]. It will be brought to Bridport
Inlet on the island's southern coast for liquifying, storage
and loading, via a 161 kilometer buried pipeline. From this
point a pair of icebreaking liquified natural gas (LMG)
carriers will make deliveries to a terminal in eastern
Canada. These 1100-foot ships will have turbo-electric power
plants driving three propellers [Ref. 65] , and will cost an
estimated $530 million each [Ref. 136].
In comparison with Dome's crude oil tankers, the LNG car-
riers will be narrower, and because of the lightness of
natural gas, will have half the displacement and draw less
water. This latter characteristic exposes the propellers to
greater hazards from ice and makes them less efficient. It
also gives the ship less icebreaking ability: in spite of
one-third more power, they will be rated as class VII where
Dome's tankers will be class X [Ref. 65].
With heavy government involvement, the Arctic Pilot
Project reflects concerns which go beyond normal commercial
objectives. In addition to providing 225 million cubic feet
of gas to Canadian consumers each day, the undertaking is




--provide economic activity for both northern and
southern Canada.
--move Canada to the technological forefront, especially
in the commercial icebreaking field.
--spur development of northern territories.
The Arctic Pilot Project is in some ways more ambitious
than Dome's pioneering efforts in the Beaufort Sea. The $1.7
billion project has had its target date for beginning
operation slipped from 1983 to 1985 [Ref. 105], and even the
extension seems optimistic in view of the project's scope.
But talks with Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company
began in mid 1980, concerning construction of the LNG tankers
[Ref. 116] and all indications point to its continuation.
A similar project has been proposed for exploiting gas
resources in the vicinity of Ellef Ringes Island. Trans-
Canada Pipelines Ltd, of which Dome is the principal share-
holder, is studying the plan, which would involve transpor-
tation of the gas in three 75,000 ton class X icebreaking LNG
carriers. It has been stated that there would be no
competition with the Arctic Pilot Project [Ref. 136].
Taking a different approach to the transportation issue
is the Polar Gas Consortium. Consisting of Panarctic, Trans-
Canada Pipelines, Tenneco, Petro-Canada and Ontario Energy
Corporation, the consortium began planning a gas pipeline
from the arctic islands in 1972. The Y-shaped line would
bring gas from the Mackenzie Delta as well as from the
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islands. The hope is to have the system in place by the late
1980s [Ref. 105]. With all the disadvantages of pipeline
construction, the project appears to have somewhat less
momentum than the marine alternatives.
C. THE POLITICAL SETTING
The Canadian energy industry is marked by more government
involvement than is suffered by its American counterpart.
Much of this difference derives from a desire to protect
Canada's considerable energy resources from domination by
foreign interests. Foreign control is not a hollow issue:
19 of Canada's top 25 producing companies [Ref. 106], and 72
per cent of the entire oil and gas business [Ref. 137] are
foreign controlled. The result of this political sentiment
is a steady stream of often conflicting signals which the
private sector must interpret, and a more volatile
environment in which to operate.
The duality of government cues is illustrated by the
following example. In 1977 a "superdeplet ion" allowance was
introduced, permitting companies such as Dome to write off
200 per cent of exploratory costs. This provision expired in
March 1980, reverting to a 133 per cent level, and has been
the source of much uncertainty for companies operating in
Canada [Ref. 151]. Tending to nullify the supportive nature
of superdeplet ion are price controls which have kept Canadian
oil prices at roughly half of world rates [Ref. 151]. This
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has naturally tended to hold down production and puts
Canadian government policy moving in an opposite direction
from that in the U. S.
On the whole, however, Canadian government policy has
been generally favorable to northern energy development.
When Dome made its large Beaufort Sea strikes in 1979,
Canadian domestic reserves had fallen for the tenth
consecutive year and arctic resources represented an
attractive solution. Yet the picture has been complicated by
prospects of offshore oil in the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.
With this area's proximity to consuming markets and fewer
technological problems to overcome, priority could
conceivably shift away from the arctic [Ref. 79].
Canadian government involvement is most conspicuous in
its ownership of Petro-Canada , formed in 1975. An expanded
role for the state owned company is one key element in the
Trudeau government's new national energy policy announced in
October 1980 [Ref. 106]. Other items included:
—government appropriation of 25 per cent of oil company
reserves [Ref. 87]
.
--guaranteed pretax margins of 38 per cent for oil and 47
per cent for gas [Ref. 87].
--incentives for reducing oil demand and substituting gas
[Ref. 114]
.
--"Canad iani zat ion" of the industry, with a goal of 50
per cent Canadian ownership by 1990 [Ref. 114].
--a system of cash grants which could reimburse up to 80
per cent of exploration costs.
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--formation of a National Petroleum Agency, which would
control production and sale, establish a national marketing
system, compel private production in emergencies, and
administer incentives for Canad iani zing the industry [Ref.
118] .
Industry reactions to the policy were understandably
negative, though varied. By December 1980 a trend toward
reduced capital budgets and postponed projects was noted; and
an exodus of drilling rigs to a more lucrative exploratory
environment in the U. S. was underway [Ref. 107]. Dome
Petroleum voiced concern for the viability of its Beaufort
Sea operations, and labelled Trudeau's policies as "highway
robbery" and "confiscation." The market value of Dome stock
fell more than 20 per cent in the two days following the
budget message [Ref. 87]. Nonetheless, Dome may increase its
Canadian ownership to 75 per cent to qualify for extra
exploration rights in frontier areas [Ref. 122].
Imperial Oil, the largest integrated oil company in
Canada with $5.6 billion in revenues, was more sanguine. As
a 70 per cent owned subsidiary of Exxon, the company
acknowledged that it is a prime target for nationalization,
but admitted to no plans for significant withdrawals or
reduction in its Canadian activities [Ref. 86].
The after effects of the new government policy will
reverberate in a complex political setting. Canada imports
500,000 barrels of oil per day [Ref. 103], which is primarily
consumed in the eastern provinces. The western producing
provinces, and especially Alberta, feel more affinity for U.
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S. policies and are bridling under the price controls and
other policies set in Ottawa [Ref. 106], Alberta has
threatened to cut back production by March 1981 if
negotiations with the federal government do not move in a
favorable direction [Ref. 120]. The issue is so divisive
that it threatens the very foundations of the Canadian
federation.
Bureaucracies within the Canadian government itself have
differing goals and alignments with respect to the
development issue. The Department of Energy, Mines and
Resources (DEMR) generally sides with the environmentalist
camp, while the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development (DIAND) has a pro-growth orientation. These
agencies are constantly at loggerheads. Since both have
extensive responsibilities in the Canadian arctic, the lack
of centralized planning and decision-making interjects an
added element of political uncertainty [Ref. 175].
The problem extends to Canadian icebreaking as well.
Even with a number of innovative marine transportation
products under development the Department of Transport has
made the determination not to react to arctic oil discoveries
or potential marine transportation through the Northwest
Passage. The new R-class icebreakers have been criticized
for adding no significant polar capability to the fleet, and
in reality would be of little assistance to arctic commercial
shipping [Ref. 147], The icebreaking policy is perhaps
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Canadian arctic development has been no less affected by
environmental considerations than have development proposals
for Alaska. There is a similar three-way confrontation
between developers, local users and protectionists [Ref. 81].
Canadian natives have grown restive as oil and gas
exploration has intensified, and this is being acknowledged
by government and industry. Dome, for example, employs
natives as 20 per cent of its arctic work force [Ref. 151]
,
and the Arctic Pilot Project has been planned to employ
northern residents but cause minimal disruption of their
communities. Liaison and participation of northerners in the
development process have been major points of emphasis [Ref.
65] .
Dome's plans for deep water Beaufort Sea drilling caused
a great deal of concern, especially with respect to the
possibility of a well blowout during exploratory drilling. A
joint government-industry undertaking, the Beaufort Sea
Project, was an innovative means of developing constraints
for drilling. The U. S. State Department reacted to the
findings with a "note of concern;" oil from a Canadian
blowout would be carried by the Beaufort Gyre into Alaskan
waters and swept onto the North Slope shoreline. Drilling
activity was eventually approved by the Canadian cabinet, but
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with a number of precautionary conditions [Ref. 155]. These
may be seriously undercut, however, by a shortage of
qualified government inspectors [Ref. 79].
The Beaufort Sea Project and other research efforts have
made headway, but because of the vastness of the Canadian
arctic, there are large information voids [Ref. 81]. The
Arctic Pilot Project in particular has been subject to
lengthy environmental review, perhaps because of government
participation in it. Petro-Canada is planning to commit $10
million annually for 20 years on technical research and
monitoring studies [Ref. 90], Of particular concern is
Lancaster Sound, an area of unusual biological productivity
and a major channel for eventual arctic tanker traffic. The
effects of an LNG tanker passing every six days has been the
subject of much debate. As in Alaska, Canadian environmental
concerns will undoubtedly cause modifications but do not
promise to seriously inhibit Canadian arctic development
efforts.
One early response to the environmental threats of arctic
marine transportation was the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act. Prompted by the MANHATTAN
operations, the legislation places stringent standards for
design, construction, navigational procedures and equipment,
pollution liability, fuel and water quantities, and bunkering
stations for commercial ships operating in the Canadian
arctic. There are shipping safety control zones, and speci-
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fications as to the class of ice capability allowed in each
zone at various times of the year [Ref. 139]. An "ice navi-
gator" is required for each vessel, although this qualifi-
cation is satisfied by five days operating experience in the
ice [Ref. 91]. The Act is reflective of the serious issue of
sovereignty which has arisen from recent events in the
arctic; this will be discussed more fully in Chapter VIII.
D. SPILLOVER: EFFECTS ON ALASKAN DEVELOPMENT
It is appropriate at this point to examine the
relationship of Canadian arctic developments to the future of
arctic Alaska. The principal effect will be a technological
"pull" on Alaskan development, resulting from engineering
breakthroughs and proven arctic techniques. These will
involve arctic drilling, storage and production methods,
especially the deep water Beaufort Sea operations of Dome
Petroleum; and as importantly, the marine systems which will
transport energy resources to user markets. Successful
Canadian projects will greatly reduce risk, lower costs and
make similar development projects in arctic Alaska more
attractive. The operative word, of course, is "successful."
If current Canadian plans are carried through, the country
will be the world leader in arctic energy development by the
end of the decade.
One other factor will have ramifications for Alaskan
energy development and wider issues as well. An agreement
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between Japan National Oil Company (JMOC) and Dome Petroleum
was concluded in mid 1980, involving a JNOC loan of $400
million to finance Beaufort Sea development efforts. The
main intent of the Japanese company was to obtain rights to
Canadian oil; under the agreement, JNOC will receive a share
of production in proportion to the share of development costs
it financed. There is no guarantee, however, that the oil
can eventually be exported to Japan, since this would require
approval by the National Energy Board and Canadian government
certification that the oil is in excess of Canada's needs.
But even if export is disapproved, JNOC could market the oil
in Canada [Ref . 117]
.
The Dome-JNOC agreement is significant because it raises
the very real possibility of a marine transportation system
carrying Canadian oil through the Bering Sea. There is an
inherent logic in the distances involved: Japan is 4000
nautical miles from the Beaufort Sea and 8000 from the
unstable Persian Gulf [Ref. 46]. The Japanese have indicated
a willingness to invest up to $2 billion if development of
the Beaufort Sea fields proceeds [Ref. 117]. In late 1980,
Chubu Electric and Nissho-Iwai were negotiating with Dome for
natural gas supplies; while this particular transaction will
probably involve export from a terminal north of Vancouver
[Ref. 117], there appears to be ample potential for the use
of Japanese capital in developing Canadian arctic resources.
Given the arduousness of marine transport to eastern Canada
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and lack of a need for oil and gas in the western provinces,
an international Point Barrow-Bering Stra i t-Unimak Pass
transportation corridor is a real possibility.
An overview of Canadian arctic developments provides the
following outlook:
— in view of the heavy investment already committed,
government involvement, and a head start, arctic development
projects will not be seriously disrupted by Grand Banks
prospects
.
--Dome Petroleum will have commercial production from
Beaufort Sea wells by the end of the decade. The oil will be
moved in icebreaking tankers.
--Beaufort Sea oil appears likely to be exported in some
quantity to Japan. Imports will still be necessary in
eastern Canada by the time Beaufort production comes on line,
and this will be a political factor working against export.
However, the Bering Sea route represents a more reasonable
marine transportation alternative and difficulties may be
solved by Japanese-supplied oil to the Atlantic coast. In
the long term, offshore east coast production may also solve
the problem.
— the Arctic Pilot Project will move into operation,
aided by government participation and subsidiary national
objectives. The 1985 target date seems likely to slip. The
LNG will be moved by icebreaking tankers.
— the pace of Beaufort Sea and other arctic development
efforts will depend on incentives or disincentives imbedded
in government policies. The current government presence and
nationalistic sentiment make this factor even more
significant that is the case for arctic Alaska.
--Canadian results will stimulate the Alaskan energy
scene as previously noted. Dome's Beaufort Sea efforts are
most relevant; success there will enhance the attractiveness
of developing the offshore Alaskan Beaufort and the Bering
Sea provinces.
The ambitious projects underway in Canada have yet to
prove their efficacy, but they represent two potential
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sources of influence on the U. S. These are the
technological leadership "pull" and the impact of foreign
ship transits through American coastal waters. While the
former factor will affect the energy development process in
arctic Alaska, the latter will have a direct impact on the
Coast Guard and its icebreaking role. It will be further
discussed in Chapter IX.
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VIII. THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The arctic's geographic centrality has been long
unrecognized, a victim of cartography's representation of the
world. The usual Mercator projection leaves only a
peripheral (and greatly distorted) margin of arctic land and
water, and undoubtedly this presentation has been as
responsible for the arctic's general neglect as have its
forbidding characteristics. More realistically, however, the
arctic is the geographic center of the northern hemisphere
and therefore of most of the earth's land mass, population
and economic wealth. A polar projection or a globe
demonstrates this reality (see Figure 8-1).
International interest in the arctic is on the ascent,
and this is due principally to the successes of applied
knowledge. The advent of technology is steadily reducing the
arctic's effectiveness as a barrier to a wide range of human
activities. Development of energy resources, the focus of
previous chapters, is currently foremost among these
activities. But the demise of the arctic as too forbidding
to be relevant brings the area increasingly into the realm of
international affairs.
A. SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES








The Arctic Center of the Northern Hemisphere
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temperate latitudes, has been found wanting in recent
applications to developing arctic issues. Sovereignty is
perhaps the prime concern. Driven by the promise of vast new
resources, the problem of ownership rights has emerged with a
number of features unique to this part of the world. Ongoing
Law of the Sea negotiations are resolving many of these
issues, but many complications remain.
Should ice, for example, be regarded as "water" or as
"territory?" Drifting ice has been cited as a basis for
questioning classification of the Arctic Ocean as high seas
[Ref. 5]. The permanence of much of the arctic' s ice and the
fact that it is often as passable as land gives a great deal
of credence to the territorial description. But this would
seemingly open the Arctic Ocean's huge ice pack to
colonization, and does not resolve the problems of its
constant movement. If, on the other hand, movement
disqualifies permanent ice as land, is a grounded ice island
to be regarded as territory? Do semi-permanent ice research
stations, which move with the pack, have the same legal
status as ships? Although there are no clear cut answers,
international legal practice currently tends to ignore
temporary ice coverage but takes some cognizance of permanent
ice for the purposes of sovereignty [Ref. 69]. The issue
is far from fully resolved.
Territorial claims in the arctic are noteworthy. There
is a general lack of agreement on coastal state jurisdiction
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over arctic seas [Ref. 5]. The previously mentioned dispute
in partitioning the Beaufort Sea between Alaska and Canada is
one reflection of this. Potentially more serious is the
Norwegian-Soviet controversy over their continental shelf
boundary and rights to Svalbard (Spitsbergen) resources. A
lack of resolution of this problem has contributed to the lag
in oil exploration in the European arctic.
Canada in 1925 laid claim to all lands and islands, known
or yet to be discovered, lying in a sector described by the
North Pole, the 141st meridian west of Greenwich, and a point
equidistant from the coasts of Ellesmere Island and
Greenland. In the following year the Soviet Union made a
similar sector claim, and acknowledged the existence of four
other sectors of sovereignty belonging to Canada, Norway, the
U. S. and Denmark (by virtue of its ownership of Greenland)
[Ref. 69]. However, the Soviet press has also voiced claims
to the ice, water and air space within their sector. Since
the sector principle has no basis in international law and
has never been litigated in international courts, it offers
little firm guidance [Ref. 5], The official positions of the
United States, Denmark and Norway have maintained that arctic
waters beyond a territorial sea belt are, as in other parts
of the world, high seas; and that this is irrespective of ice
cover. Canada has leaned to this view, but perhaps somewhat





The status of arctic waterways is at the center of the
sovereignty question, for in this respect it is more than a
technical legal issue. The future of commercial arctic
marine transportation will depend to a large degree on the
right of transit through waterways such as the Northwest
Passage and certain straits in the Russian arctic. The
Soviets have declared the Kara, Laptev and East Siberian Seas
to be internal waters, and have designated their Northern Sea
Route a "national route," presumably excluding uninvited
foreign use [Ref. 69]. U. S. icebreaker probes were made by
the NORTHWIND in 1965 and the EDISTO and EASTWIND in 1967.
In addition to conducting scientific research, the ships were
attempting to transit the Northeast Passage. They eventually
turned back rather than challenge strong Soviet opposition
[Ref. 69]. The Canadians are similarly, though perhaps not
so xenophobically , concerned about the Northwest Passage. It
appears to be much closer to routine commercial use.
A crucial issue is whether such waterways are
"international straits," where freedom of passage is
identical to that on the high seas. Under the test utilized
by the International Court in the Corfu Channel case of 1949
(ICJ. Rep 4) , a strait must have been a useful route for
international maritime traffic to meet the definition. Since
the Northwest Passage has had only about 25 complete
crossings since Amundsen's initial transit, and the six
foreign crossings were all with Canadian sanction, this
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particular waterway is therefore not an international strait
by the Corfu Channel definition. [Ref. 1391.
However, even if the Northwest Passage were to become an
international strait, the right of imposing special pollution
requirements would remain. The Canadian delegation to the
Law of the Sea Conference pressed hard for the insertion of a
so-called "ice-covered area" provision. It reads as follows:
Coastal states have the right to establish and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention,
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in
ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclulsive
economic zone, where particularly severe climatic
conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for
most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards
to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment
could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of
the ecological balance [Ref. 139].
This clause was inserted in the Negotiating Text of 1976 and
has survived intact in the 1977, 1979 and 1980 revisions. In
essence, it validates the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act of 1970 and has received wide support,
including that of the United States which had strongly
opposed the 1970 legislation [Ref. 139]. In the opinion of a
Canadian professor of international law, the "ice-covered
area" clause may now be regarded as a part of customary
international law [Ref. 139].
The issue may become an important U. S. concern as well.
with foreign tankers regularly plying the coastal waters of
Alaska, concern for the environmental integrity of these
areas will arise. The "ice-covered area" clause will provide
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a vehicle for instituting and enforcing environmental rules
for foreign shipping.
Transportation thus appears to be the most immediate
focus of the arctic sovereignty debate. The Canadian
response to commercial arctic traffic seems to be an even-
handed and reasonable one, permitting innocent passage with
suitable provisions for control of environmental damage,
within the context of international agreement. The Soviet
response to similar issues will be more interesting.
B. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARCTIC
More so than any other nation, the Soviet Union is an
arctic land. It spans almost half of the land arc fronting
the Arctic Ocean. Soviet Communism has reinforced a historic
northern orientation: development of northern resources,
promoting larger populations and installing the necessary
logistic systems have been recurring items in Soviet five
year plans.
Resource exploitation in particular has been a relentless
goal, and the Soviet Union has been far more active in
developing resources than any other arctic nation. This has
often been done at enormous cost, to achieve self-sufficiency
and satisfy socio-political objectives [Ref. 5]. The mining
of many metals and other minerals has been long established,
coal, oil and gas are now extracted, and the existing





Ob 1 Basin and to a lesser extent, the Pechora Basin, are
sites of huge natural gas reserves [Ref. 5]. Rumors of a
giant new Siberian oil field, containing seven times the
world's current proven reserves, were circulating in late
1980, but these concerned a long established shale formation
from which the Soviets have squeezed only marginal
production. The U. S. Geological Survey believes an
underground nuclear explosion in October 1979 was an attempt
to stimulate oil flow [Ref. 125].
In spite of its position as one of the world's largest
producers of hydrocarbon energy, the Soviet Union has been
eager to develop arctic oil and gas reserves. The 1981-85
Five Year Plan includes record drilling increases, but these
will not stem production declines which are the result of
poorly planned, sluggishly executed programs in the 1970s.
Western Siberia will have a leading role in new development,
but exploration will also be conducted in Eastern Siberia and
the Kara and Barents Seas [Ref. 133].
The Soviet push to explore and develop its more
inaccessible reserves will be greatly hindered by a lack of
technological sophistication. The lag, compared to state-of-
the-art in the West, has been estimated at 15 years [Ref.
151]. As a result, there has been heavy reliance on imported
technology. Three drillships are currently being constructed
in Finland for use in the Kara and Barents Seas; the 490-foot
vessels will be capable of drilling to ^000 meters in water
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up to 300 meters deep. Delivery of the lead ship will be in
1931, with operations to start in 1983 [Ref. 134]. It has
been noted that President Carter's trade embargo resulting
from the invasion of Afghanistan has seriously affected the
transfer of drillbit technology to the Soviet Union [Ref.
121]. How severely the recent cooling of U. S. -Soviet rela-
tions will delay production plans is not clear, but offshore
drilling technology seems especially sensitive [Ref. 5].
One area of longstanding Soviet dominance is arctic
marine transportation. Waterborne transport has been the key
to utilization of far north resources, and designation of the
2800-kilometer Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a "national route"
reflects a parallel security concern. Extending from Novaya
Zemlya to the Bering Strait, the NSR is open about five
months each year for a two-way flow of goods from towns on
the coast and from inland river sites [Ref. 142]. More than
half of the four million tons of cargo is timber from the
Igarka and Noril'sk areas [Ref. 5], The NSR's importance as
a binding national link is great; it has been described as an
alternative to the Trans-Siberian Railroad [Ref. 143].
There is also a darker side to the NSR's history. It was
used extensively in the 1930s to transport prisoners to
arctic labor camps. Solzhenitsyn has described an early
season transit of several prison barges and the icebreaker
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The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest icebreaker
fleet, as shown in Table 8-1; not all are employed in the
arctic since there are extensive icebreaking requirements in
the Baltic, Caspian and Black Seas, in the Soviet Far East,
and on inland rivers. Almost half of the fleet was built in
Finland's Wartsila Shipyard, which is the centerpoint of
world icebreaker technology. The Soviets have, in addition,
numerous ice-capable cargo vessels, organized in six classes
of ice worthiness. The 1977 register listed 257 ships in the
"UL" and "ULA" classes, which are permitted to navigate
independently as well as astern of icebreakers [Ref. 146],
There is reportedly a new generation of icebreakers and ice-
strengthened ships under study [Ref. 1421.
In August 1977 the nuclear-powered ARKTIKA became the
first surface ship to reach the North Pole. Credit for this
accomplishment must rest chiefly on ice reconnaissance which
revealed a huge polynya, or open water lead in the ice [Ref.
29]. In May and June of the following year, SIBIR and an
accompanying freighter transited from Murmansk to the Chukchi
Sea, utilizing a high arctic route that touched the 83rd
parallel [Ref. 29] . The intention behind these exploits is
not clear. They have no relevance to Northern Siberian
transportation; experimentation with commercial





Long term Soviet goals for the NSR probably include year-
round navigation for this thoroughfare. Good progress has
been made in the western areas, but more icebreakers, cargo
vessels and navigational systems have been cited as
requirements for extending the season on the remainder of the




since the 1940s summers (defined as periods
with positive air temperatures) have decreased by one month
in the Soviet arctic, and the mean annual air temperatures
over the Kara Sea has fallen by three degrees Centigrade
[Refs. 5, 142]. Advances in technology and technique may be
merely offsetting a deterioration in climate [Ref. 142].
C. DEFENSE ISSUES
The degree of Soviet arctic orientation and involvement
inevitably affects the international defense picture.
Technological advances have, as previously mentioned, reduced
the arctic's "barrier" role which historically has guarded
rather than threatened the owner nations [Ref. 84]. The
region's centrality is coming increasingly into focus.
In conjunction with the push of technology is the
emergence of development activities, particularly the energy-
related ones, which demand a closer look at arctic defense.
Alaska's principal contribution to the national defense has
heretofore been as a forward positon, providing early warning
capability. The area is now intrinsically valuable; national
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security may in the future hinge largely on energy
independence and Alaska's oil and gas production would become
doubly priceless in a conventional conflict. As it now
stands, these facilities are extremely vulnerable to attack,
and large tank vessels would make spectacularly attractive
targets. Moreover, the U. S.-Canad ian arctic is very lightly
defended. In Alaska, there is a special-duty army brigade
and a squadron of fighter aircraft. The Canadian arctic
boasts a fine network of airfields but no combat aircraft,
significant ground troops, warships or missile installations
[Ref. 84]. Neither American nor Canadian icebreakers carry
any significant armament.
The Soviet threat is considerably more formidable. There
are at least seven Soviet airborne divisions, several special
reconnaissance and sabotage brigades, four brigades of naval
infantry and large numbers of arctic-trained troops. Soviet
planning includes use of so-called "Desant" operations, or
air and sea landings to capture or destroy military bases in
enemy territory. Potential targets also include pipelines,
oil field installations, weather stations and police posts.
Familiarization with climate and terrain will give the
Soviets an added edge in arctic operations [Ref. 84]. As
development in arctic Alaska proceeds, the number of
militarily suitable targets will increase.
Another "militarizing" threat to the arctic stems from
missile-firing submarines. The Soviets are building a new
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class of very large submarines (18,000 tons, dived) [Ref.
11]. Since Soviet coastal areas are isolated from the
world's principal oceans, these new strategic submarines
could conceivably be based in the Murmansk area and deployed
in the Arctic Ocean to avoid transiting the well-patrolled
Greenland-Iceland-Uni ted Kingdom "gap." Such a strategy is
not without drawbacks, particulary with respect to
communications
.
In evaluating an arctic wartime scenario, the importance
of naval forces and surface shipping, apart from possible
sub-arctic mine-laying and anti-submarine warfare, will be
negligible [Ref. 84]. These forces would be easily detected
and destroyed in an all-out conflict [Ref. 70]. Troops would
undoubtedly be employed in small numbers to defend or secure
the scattering of strategically valuable points. In this
regard, large transport aircraft can be viewed as the key to
arctic military operations [Ref. 84]. Such a scenario
contrasts with the early days of World War II, when
surreptitious German weather stations were established in
Greenland and had to be laboriously taken by landing parties
from ships. Coast Guard cutters were centrally involved in
these operations [Ref. 1].
Recent world events have demonstrated that a fully
integrated defense must plan for more than the threat of
conventional military forces. Terrorist operations will
undoubtedly continue as a means of accomplishing certain
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political objectives. The Alaska Pipeline has been the
target of more than one amateurish though damaging attempt at
sabotage, and military and FBI studies have concluded that
little can be done to effectively secure it [Ref. 4], With
the expansion of the development facilities, the increased
risk of serious terrorist damage is not encouraging.
A final related issue involves the harrassment of
peaceful undertakings in the arctic. The case in point is
the shadowing of the Norwegian vessel POLARSIRKEL by a Soviet
icebreaker during research operations near northeastern
Greenland in 1979 [Ref. 175]. Such activity is no more
acceptable in the arctic than on high seas elsewhere.
The superpowers face each other across the Arctic Ocean,
and the confrontation is no longer merely in an East-West
setting. As one author predicts, "In the future, this
region could become the center of the West's military
position, with the Orient and Europe on the wings,
geographically and perhaps even politically" [Ref. 84].
American policy will be under increasing pressure to
acknowledge this possibility.
D. TOWARD A UNITED STATES ARCTIC POLICY
Inspite of arctic Alaska's growing importance since the
1968 oil announcement, there is no clearly stated U.S. policy
regarding the arctic [Ref. 164] . Neither is there a
"managing agency" as an Office of Management and the Budget
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circular designated the National Science Foundation for the
U.S. antarctic program [Ref. 37]. It would be incorrect to
state that the highest levels of the federal government are
oblivious to changes in the arctic; instead, interests and
responsibilities for the multi-faceted region are splintered
among a large numger of cognizant agencies and lack an
integrated focus. The situation is in some regards analogous
to that in Canada.
A significant step toward formulation of an arctic policy
came with creation of the Inter-Agency Policy Group (IAPG).
This high-level council was established on November 8, 1979
by National Security Council Director Zbigniew Brzezinsk i
;
the driving force was the initiative of Thomas Pickering,
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Afairs (OES). The IAPG absorbed
the activities of a previously dormant National Security
Council responsibility [Ref. 167].
IAPG membership includes [Ref. 167]:
—Assistant Secretary of State (OES) as chairman.
--Department of Transportation, represented by the
Commandant of the Coast Guard; his alternate is the Chief,
Office of Operations.
—National Atmospheric and Oceanographic Administration.
—Department of Energy.
—National Aeronautics and Space Administration.





--Office of Science and Technology Policy.
--Council for Environmental Quality.
—Central Intelligence Agency.
—U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
--Federal Aviation Administration.
— U. S. Air Force.
The group has produced a number of working papers on
various arctic issues [Ref. 167], and a study to determine
methods of speeding hydrocarbon removal is underway [Ref.
164]. However, there has been little visible evidence of
shifts in policy.
The incumbent Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral John
B. Hayes, has indicated especial interest in the arctic, due
in part perhaps to his previous assignment as Commander of
the Seventeenth District which is comprised of the entire
state of Alaska. The Coast Guard is seeking development and
promulgation of an arctic policy through its membership in
the IAPG [Ref. 164]
.
Although less directly oriented toward arctic policy, the
National Petroleum Council is studying certain issues as a
joint government-industry project. The Committee on arctic
oil and gas resources was tasked by Energy Secretary Duncan
to undertake a comprehensive review of the hydrocarbon energy
situation in the region. In addition to formulating a
composite estimate of resources in place [Ref. 169],
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transportation requirments through 2000 will be indent i fied
[Ref. 164]. The Marine Science and Icebreaking Division
chief from Coast Guard headquarters is a member of the
committee
.
It remains to be seen whether a comprehensive arctic
policy will emerge at the federal level, particularly with a
recent change of administrations. However, the following
occurrences seem likely:
— the sovereignty issue will be debated in principle, and
work toward defining the legal status of the arctic will
continue under the auspices of the Law of the Sea Conference.
Sovereignty issues will most directly affect the United
States, however, by institution of foreign-flag tanker
traffic. Concern over the threat to Alaska's coastal waters
will undoubtedly result in bilateral negotiations and
stringent operational regulations.
— as oil and gas development expands, there will be
increasing awareness of the vulnerability of these facilities
as military targets, and of the importance of arctic energy
to the national security. However, there will probably be
little material response to this awareness due, in part, to
the urgency of more traditional defense needs; the
impossibility of completely securing the facilites will also
be a barrier to incremental expansion of Alaskan defense
resources. Awareness of military sensitivity may be
incorporated in planning and in arctic training for units
based in the "lower 48." This is now occuring on a limited
basis
.
--securing of energy facilities against sabotage or
terrorist damage may be more readily dealt with. Government-
industry cooperation in this area seems likely. In addition,
protection of legitimate arctic activity from foreign
interference could become a concern.
—taking cognizance of the arctic's importance to
defense, Canada may, within the context of the North Atlantic
Alliance, attempt to shift more of its defense posture to the
arctic and away from central Europe. This would be closer to
direct Canadian interests and even desirable for NATO. The
small Canadian military forces might be more effectively
useful on home ground, securing the arctic "central front."
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--Soviet arctic development will, unlike events in the
Canadian arctic, exert little direct influence on the future
of arctic Alaska. This is due to the Soviet technology lag,
and to the greatly differing geographic, social and political
settings in the Soviet Union and Alaska.
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IX. COAST GUARD ICEBREAKING, ARCTIC ALASKA AMD THE FUTURE
A. SYNTHESIS
The preceeding five chapters have attempted to examine,
separately and in detail, each of five issues which were
selected as relevant indicators of the future in arctic
Alaska. As was previously mentioned in Chapter III/ the
benefit of such an approach is the closer and clearer focus
that is allowed by "specialized" examination; the risk is
that of losing an overall perspective. The purpose of this
chapter is twofold: to "reconnect" the five issues into a
comprehensible view of of probable events extending to the
end of the century, and to draw from this a likely impact on
Coast Guard icebreaking needs.
Figure 9-1 models a process of relationships between
various facets of the five issues. The matrix in Figure 9-2
describes the manner in which they relate to each other most
significantly.
The process in Figure 9-1 centers around two development
decisions and two transportation decisions which will
determine the future in arctic Alaska, and three slightly
differing decisions in Canada. Factors which directly
influence these decisions and the results which stem from
them are shown. The outcome of one decision often becomes
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significant input into another. The eventual "fallout" from
this process are likely impacts on the icebreaking program.
The central decisions involve development of the hydro-
carbon resources and transportation of the products. As the
concluding lines of Chapter IV indicated, energy development
will be, with little doubt, the driving force behind events
in arctic Alaska for the forseeable future. Further, it was
stated in Chapter III that waterborne transportation, as one
of the Coast Guard's core concerns, would perhaps be the most
significant channel for energy activity to affect the ice-
breaking mission. Figure 9-1 demonstrates this flow.
A number of possible event combinations (though by no
means all of them) are shown in the figure. In the near-
term, for example, accelerated leasing and exploration will
in all probability uncover significant new reserves on the
North Slope. But as discussed in Chapter IV, it is unlikely
that this will push total North Slope daily production over
the two million barrel level. Thus TAPS will continue to be
the sole mode of transportation, and the impact on the Coast
Guard will be moderate.
In a slightly longer range context (c. 1995: see Figure
4-3), however, Bering Sea production will necessitate choice
between a marine transportation system and additional
pipeline construction. With the small likelihood of the
latter alternative, a marine route must be chosen, and the
Bering Sea-Unimak Pass circuit seems most favorable. The
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transportation choices are discussed in Chapter V. It was
also noted that an installed transportation system will have
a reinforcing effect on the decision to develop contiguous
areas
.
Influencing U. S. decision points will be concerns for
existing natural and social environmental systems, the
subject of Chapter VI. The rate of leasing and exploration,
the level of production, and the mode of transportation for
extracted oil and gas will be affected. Canadian arctic
events will also be a source of influence. A move toward
high arctic production levels, which appears to be underway
in Canada, will affect Alaskan production; as Chapter VII
points out, this will be chiefly through the "pull" of new
technology and technique. Canadian sovereignty concerns will
similarly be a factor in route selection for a marine
transportation system.
Should Canada make the political decision to export its
arctic resources, or to use a western sea corridor for
transportation to domestic markets, a direct impact on
American sovereignty and national security concerns will
result. Soviet moves in the arctic and changes in Canada's
defense posture will be parallel influences, as discussed in
Chapter VIII.
Two qualifications of Figure 9-1 are in order. First, it
should be noted that the decisions shown are not simple
executive choices; in most cases neither are they solely
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political choices. They represent instead broad questions
which must be resolved by all segments of society. The
decision on level of production, for example, will be made as
a synthesis of input from industry, local residents, the
environmental lobbies, and governmental entities. This leads
directly to the second point: the figure represents a
simplification of reality and a set of only the most
plausible relationships. The inclusion of all possible
combinations of events is not practically possible. Limited
though the method may be, it is possible to surmise potential
impacts on the need for public icebreaker support.
B. IMPACTS ON THE ICEBREAKING PROGRAM
However the future unfolds, icebreaking ships seem
assured of having a role in polar marine transportation.
Cost-benefit analysis of icebreaker-assisted cargo carrying
supports this argument [Ref. 37], and few other alternatives
can match the multi-faceted capability and endurance of an
icebreaker
.
Figure 1-3 provides a conceptual framework of polar
icebreaking functions, viewed primarily as servicing the
needs of user organizations. Certain Coast Guard-generated
requirements are also involved. For application to the
circumstances in the western arctic, the elements of Figure
1-3 can be distilled into three broad, functional areas:
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— scientific research support.
--assistance to vessels.
--support of other Coast Guard operating programs, or
requirements generated by the Coast Guard itself. Current
Alaskan icebreaking involves all of these, but demands of the
future will not touch them equally.
The largest growth will probably emanate from the latter
two functions: there will be expanding demand for
traditional vessel assistance, along with dramatic increases
in the arctic requirements of other Coast Guard operating
programs. Research will remain, but as an essentially static
or "low growth" activity. Interest in scientific inquiry
will undoubtedly be enhanced by arctic development; however,
as an indirect resultant of processes in motion, it will be
shouldered aside by more pressing needs.
As Figure 9-1 indicates, requirements for assistance to
commercial vessels will result from several pathways in the
diagram. Whatever the degree of energy development in arctic
Alaska, movement of materials by tug and barge will be an
integral factor. As was the case in the development of
Prudhoe Bay, this will necessitate at least occasional
icebreaker support. The impact becomes more significant if a
product carrying marine system develops. Icebreaking tankers
from the North Slope or Chukchi Sea, however powerful, will
require at least standby icebreaking capability, and less
ice-worthy Bering Sea shipping perhaps to a greater extent.
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Shipment of arctic Alaskan oil or gas through the Northwest
Passage will entail not only icebreaking support in American
waters but undoubtedly a sharing of responsibility for
Canadian waterways as well [Ref. 37]. (This adds one more
complicating feature to the Northwest Passage alternative).
Finally, vessel assistance would be involved in foreign ship
transits of arctic Alaskan waterways, if only for emergency
purposes
.
Determination of the level of icebreaker support to be
provided will be a difficult policy issue for the Coast Guard
to resolve. For movement of development materials, the
industry would without doubt desire a wide range of available
resources, instantaneous response, and a shipping season of
maximuum length. Against these demands must be matched a
finite number of icebreaking resources, and a balance struck
with other requirements in the western arctic and in other
parts of the world. The precedent for Coast Guard icebreaker
assistance exists in the Prudhoe Bay convoy operations, but
providing support for large scale marine operations could be
seen as a responsibility to be partially shared by industry.
Reimbursement for icebreaker service is one possibility. It
is even conceivable that the multinational oil industry would
move to develop its own support ships rather than depend on
the exigencies of the budgetary process. Canada's Dome





Nonetheless, it seems clear that support of energy-
related arctic transportation will be viewed by the Coast
Guard as a central responsibility; this position will arise
from the strong transportation focus of the entire service,
from the traditional vessel assistance aspect of icebreaking
in particular, and from the high national priority placed on
petroleum availability [Refs. 37, 164]. It is perhaps
unnecessary to add that providing substantial icebreaker
support will require additional resources.
The second principal source of requirements will result
from the other Coast Guard operating programs, and these
expanded programmatic needs will similarly arise from events
now in motion. Icebreakers will to a significant degree
provide the capability for prosecuting these program
responsibilities in a unique and demanding environment. This
will represent a further affirmation of the multi-program
status of Coast Guard operating units. Many of the potential
program requirements involve elements of a transportation
support system, mentioned in Chapter V. Potential program
requirements include:
--search and rescue (SAR): since the arctic will at
least initially be devoid of other SAR facilities, ice-
breakers will be the prime units for assisting personnel and
property in ice-covered waters. Response will be enhanced by
helicopters carried onboard. There will obviously be a fine
distinction between SAR and vessel assistance, e. g. the
point at which a ship beset in the ice becomes endangered.
Workboats used to service offshore installations constitute a
large SAR potential. Overall, SAR will not be a new require-
ment: from 1974 to 1979, Coast Guard icebreakers responded
to 17 calls for assistance in the Alaskan arctic [Ref. 1611.
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--aids to navigation (ATOM): while icebreakers will not
in all likelihood assume full responsibility for a system of
arctic marine aids, they will undoubtedly be called upon to
restore outages and to service aids unreachable by other
means. Again, helicopter capability will be a decided asset.
—marine environmental protection (MEP) : icebreakers
will provide a surface and air surveillance capability, and
perhaps more importantly, act as platforms for monitoring and
conducting cleanup efforts almost year-round. Recent Coast
Guard planning for an arctic pollution response system
involves icebreaker logistic support [Ref. 166].
--commercial vessel safety (CVS) and port safety and
security (PSS): vessels and terminals in the arctic will be
subject to existing and possibly special regulations
administered through these programs. A seaward support
capability for port emergencies will also be desirable. In
addition, the Coast Guard has statutory responsibility for
structures such as drilling rigs on the outer continental
shelf [Ref. 2] . Icebreakers will serve as platforms for
conducting inspections and investigations.
--enforcement of laws and treaties (ELT): icebreaker
presence will represent the primary means of asserting U. S.
sovereignty over its arctic waters, and protecting national
interests in the area. As discussed in Chapter VIII,
ensuring adherence to environmental regulations will be a
central concern; the increase in fishing activity near the
Bering Sea ice edge represents another [Refs. 48, 1661.
—military preparedness and operations (MP/MO) : this is
is perhaps the most contingent of the program areas.
Icebreakers will be available to support military and naval
operations in the arctic, and would undoubtedly participate
in defense or security exercises resulting from increased
defense emphasis in the region. Icebreakers, with their
substantial fuel and stores capacity, have been suggested as
tenders for patrol boats, although presumably not in polar
environments [Ref. 77]. Icebreakers would probably be
irrelevant in an all-out conflict; but arctic shipping would
be significantly valuable in a limited war or prior to open
hostilities [Ref. 70]. Protection of research and commercial
activities from low-level harrassment may be a new facet of
the icebreaker's military role. Concern for matching
icebreaker capability with the Soviet Union and Canada has
been voiced [Refs. 48, 161]. Whatever their exact role,




The bottom of Figure 9-1 indicates the operating programs
affected by each flow of events.
With the marine science (MSA) program continuing as a
research activity, icebreaking requirements in arctic Alaska
will encompass all operating programs except boating safety
and bridge administration. The likely unfolding of events
thus respresent an extremely broad-based effect on the entire
Coast Guard. They will be manifested through requirements
for the icebreaker fleet.
C. ICEBREAKER REQUIREMENTS
The initial sections of this chapter attempted. (1) to
combine the detailed reviews of five issue areas into a
general outline of future events in arctic Alaska, and (2) to
examine the impacts of this stream of events on Coast Guard
icebreaking. The final step is to translate these impacts
into specific hardware needs. This is probably the most
difficult, and easily questioned, undertaking in this paper.
The approach here is not that of a comprehensive
quantitative study, but rather an evaluation of previous
studies and of current efforts to match icebreaking resources
to needs.
A Coast Guard study completed in 1975 [Ref. 42] omitted
potential growth of Alaskan marine commerce in its examina-
tion of icebreaking and icebreaker requirements, because this
factor was considered too speculative. Nonetheless, while
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existing resources were deemed adequate to meet 1978-85
demand, the study predicted need for an additional western
arctic icebreaker after this period. The potential
development of resources in arctic Alaska was only noted.
Long term requirements were more thoroughly examined in a
1979 Coast Guard study [Ref. 37]. The impact of energy
development in and around Alaska was very heavily emphasized,
and preliminary findings of the Coast Guard-sponsored Energy
Resources Company-E. G. Frankel (ERCO/EGF) study were used
extensively. The 1979 study concluded that:
--to meet "baseline" or current requirements only, a
fleet of five to six icebreakers will be needed through 2000.
—although the present fleet includes five icebreakers,
currently known requirements cannot be met with the existing
mix of ships.
--"aggressive pursuit" of polar energy resources will
gen- erate a requirement for approximately nine additional
icebreakers
.
This particular analysis points to two deficiencies: the
lack of a proper mix in the icebreaker fleet, and the need
for additional ships to meet upcoming demands. For
operations in arctic Alaska, imbalance in fleet mix can be
translated as lack of a shallow draft capability. This has
been recognized as a problem for some time, and was
particularly highlighted by attempts to assist Prudhoe Bay
tug and barge convoys in the 1970s. As Table 1-1
illustrates, there is no icebreaking capability between the
deep draft larger ships and the severely underpowered STORIS.
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The ERCO/EGF study recognized this need and recommended
procurement of two to four shallow draft icebreakers ("SDIB")
depending on the development scenario, in the period 1979 to
1995. These ships would have the ability to break 2.5 to 3.0
feet of ice, be helicopter capable, and possess armament and
equipment necessary to support a number of program
requirements. Basing the vessels in Dutch Harbor and Kodiak
to achieve more availability was also recommended [Ref. 48].
In a 1979 letter, the Commander of the Seventeenth Coast
Guard District (encompassing all of Alaska and its waters)
also voiced the need for development of a SDIB. The reasons
for procurement were felt to be
. . . more a matter of policy than of specific,
quantifiable needs at the present time. Opportunities for
ice assistance will certainly increase in the future, but
at a rate that is difficult to predict. I do believe that
we must keep pace with commercial development in arctic and
sub-arctic Alaska. We do not need to build a shallow-draft
icebreaker solely to "support" commercial development in
these areas, but rather, to meet the search and rescue,
enforcement of laws and treaties, emergency escort
services, defense and scientific research, and marine
environmental protection requirements associated with the
expansion of maritime commerce into ice covered waters
[Ref. 161]
.
The Coast Guard headquarters staff has begun the process
of procuring shallow draft capability with preparation of a
"Mission Needs Statement" in late 1980. This document
defines the necessity for acquiring a major system without
detailing a specific means for accomplishing it. The
statement outlines a shallow draft requirement by 1990-91,
and related the need to other program requirements as well as
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to vessel assistance [Ref . 163] . The time frame is in
consonance with the ten year lead time for new ships,
mentioned in Chapter III.
Other attempts to fill the shallow draft gap involve the
budgetary request for re-engining STORIS noted in Chapter I,
and a proposal to refit one or more of the ice-strengthened
buoy tenders. These would be purely interim measures, adding
only marginal capability to ships already approaching the
limits of their useful lives. They would, however, provide
some response to icebreaking demands that will undoubtedly
come from increased North Slope barge traffic in the middle
of this decade.
The acquisition of two (or more) SDIB will supplement the
icebreaker fleet in numbers as well as in its mix. The
POLAR-class ships will remain in service at least until the
end of the century; GLACIER will probably be decommissioned
by 1991 [Ref. 37] and one SDIB will be merely a replacement.
It should be noted, however, that supposedly worn out Coast
Guard icebreakers tend to outlive their planned
decommissionings by several years.
With these considerations, the outlook to 2000 takes the
following shape:
—GLACIER and the POLAR-class vessels are available to
carry out current icebreaking requirements, and some
additional ones, throughout the 1980s.
— a more powerful STORIS and possibly some reconditioned
buoy tenders are available for the increase in barge tonnage
in the mid 1980s. They are also able to support other
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program requirements during summers and in less demanding ice
conditions
.
--a shallow draft icebreaker becomes operational by 1991,
replacing GLACIER in western arctic deployments. The SDIB
does not have the endurance, however, to replace GLACIER'S
role in the antarctic. This fact means a reduction in POLAR-
class arctic availability if antarctic demands remain
constant
.
— a second and possibly more SDIB follow. These ships
are homeported in Alaska because of their primary dedication
to the area.
--as a marine transportation system emerges in the mid
1990s, the POLAR-class icebreakers assume the additional role
of assisting the cargo vessels when circumstances dictate.
— in extraordinary or emergency conditions, the east
coast based NORTHWIND and WESTWIND (and their eventual
replacements) are available for deployment to arctic Alaska.
Use of this "reserve" force would be inefficient, costly and
would detract from icebreaking requirements elsewhere.
In its entirety, this outlook seems to present a
reasonable response to the demands of growth in arctic
Alaska. One factor not accounted for would be a possible
need for one or more new deep draft icebreakers following
GLACIER'S decommissioning; the demands of assisting arctic
tank vessels, fulfilling antarctic requirements and meeting
the various program needs will in all likelihood exceed the
capacity of the two POLAR-class ships.
Several contingencies may require change to the above
schedule. These include:
--a speed-up in the general pace of arctic development,
generating earlier and a larger volume of logistic traffic.




--adoption of a Northwest Passage route for transporting
energy cargoes.
--large changes in the arctic' s defense status.
The outlook presented above is most likely a conservative
view. Exogenous events may speed the timetable, but given
the energy imperatives of the next twenty years, it is
doubtful that Alaska's oil and gas potential will be allowed
to lie dormant. As was stated in Chapter III, the events
that could change the energy situation overnight tend to be
outside the realm of logical forecasting.
The Coast Guard will participate meaningfully in the
emerging future of arctic Alaska, but will be principally in
the position of having to meet demands for its services. The
problem for the Coast Guard, s impl istically stated, is the
necessity to react to events years in advance of their actual
occurrence, while recognizing that obtaining the resources
for adequate response is largely a function of an
unpredictable budgetary process. It is a process the Coast
Guard can prepare for and possibly influence, but not
control. The future icebreaker fleet is ultimately decided
in this political arena, in competition with a myriad of
other programs and priorities.
The Coast Guard must, as the custodian and operator of
the nation's icebreakers, also play an advocate role for this
program. Much of the budgetary influence comes from rational
and coherent examination of the future and its demands. It
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provides the informational "ammunition" that will be needed
to ensure fulfillment of historic and statutory responsibil-
ities. The Coast Guard's icebreaking role in arctic Alaska





1. Bloomfield, Howard V. L. , The Compact History of the
United States Coast Guard
, pp. 171-82, 279, Hawthorne
Books, 1966.
2. Bragaw, Louis K., Managing a Federal Agency; The
Hidden Stimulus
, pp. 6, 42, Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1980.
3. Britannica Book of the Year— 1973 , p. 88, Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1973.
4. Britannica Book of the Year— 1978 , p. 197, Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1978.
5. Central Intelligence Agency, Polar Regions Atlas , pp.
14, 22-26, 32-33, May 1978.
6. Cicchetti, Charles J., Alaskan Oil: Alternative Routes
and Markets
, pp. 3, 56-57, 118-19, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1972.
7. Dunbar, M. J., Editor, Polar Oceans , Proceedings of
Polar Oceans Conference, McGill University, Montreal,
May 1974.
8. Encyclopaedia Britannica , v. 1 p. 500, v. 17 p. 760,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1967.
9. Herndon, Booton, The Great Land , Weybright and Talley,
1971.
10. International Petroleum Encyclopedia , The Petroleum
Publishing Company, 1979.
11. Jane's Fighting Ships 1980-81 , Jane's Publishing
Company, 1980.
12. Jane's Ocean Technology 1979-80 , Jane's Publishing
Company, 1979.
13. Kaplan, H. R. and Hunt, James F. , This is the Coast
Guard
, p. 137, Cornell Maritime Press, 1972.




15. McPhee, John, Coming into the Country / pp. 19-20, 57,
85-85, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976.
16. McWhinnie, Mary A., Editor, Polar Research , Westview
Press, 1978.
17. Milne, Allen, Oil, Ice and Climate Change; The Beaufort
Sea and the Search for Oil , Canadian Department of
Fisheries and Oceans, Ottawa, pp. 33, 85-103, undated.
18. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering at the Ends
of the Earth—Polar Ocean Technology for the 1980s ,
1979.
19. Pimlott, Douglas, Brown, Douglas, and Sam, Kenneth, Oil
Under the Ice , Canadian Arctic Resources Committee,
1976.
20. Reed, John C. , and Sater, John E. , Editors, The Coast
and Shelf of the Beaufort Sea , Symposium Proceedings,
Arctic Institute of North America, December 1974.
21. Reed, John C, Oil and Gas Development in Arctic North
America Through 2000
, p. 75, Arctic Institute of North
America, September 1973.
22. Rogers, George W. , Editor, Change in Alaska: People ,
Petroleum, and Politics
, pp. 4-5, University of Alaska
Press, 1970.
23. Ross, S. L. , Logan, W. J., and Rowland, Wade, Oil Spill
Countermeasures ; the Beaufort Sea and the Search for
Oil , Canadian Department of Fisheries and the
Environment, Ottawa, 1977.
24. Sater, John E. , Editor, The Arctic Basin , Arctic
Institute of North America, 1969.
25. Slocum, Beverly F. , Editor, Arctic Logistics Support
Technology , Arctic Institute of North America, Sym-
posium Proceedings, 1-4 November 1971.
26. Smith, William D. , Northwest Passage , pp. 172-73,
American Heritage Press, 1970.
27. Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., The Gulag Archipelago




28. Alaska, University of, Institute of Marine Science,
Assessment of the Arctic Marine Environment , "A Study
Plan for the Alaskan Continental Shelf," by H. E.
Bruce, 1976.
29.
, Geophysical Institute, A Review of Technology for
Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Recovery , by William M.
Sackinger, June 6, 1980.
30. ARCTEC, Inc., Assessment of Ice Conditions in the South
Bering Sea Based on April 1980 POLAR-class
Traff icability Test Data , V. I, June 6, 1980.
31.
, Operational Assessment of Commercial Icebreaking
Ships in Western Alaskan Waters Based on USCG POLAR-
class Traff icability Test Data , V. I, 20 July 1979.
32. , Systems for Arctic Spill Response (Executive
Summary) , April 1978.
33. Arctic Enterprises Inc., Task II; Identify Arctic
Transportation Requirements , February 7, 1980.
34. Arctic Institute of North America, Arctic Marine
Commerce (Executive Summary) , August 1973.
35. U. S. Army, Corps of Engineers, Waterborne Commerce
of the United States, Calendar Year 1977
,
part 4.
36. Bechtel, Inc., Study; Arctic Terminal for Icebreaking
Tankers, Conceptual Design (Executive Summary) , March
1979.
37. u. S. Coast Guard, Office of Operations, Marine
Science and Ice Operations Division, An Analysis
of Long-Term Requirements, Costs, and Alternatives of
of Polar Icebreaking, October 23, 1979 .
38. , Capital Investment Plan Perspective; FY 1977-86 ,
April 1975.
39.
, USCGC POLAR STAR (WAGB-10) , Final Report of
POLAR STAR Arctic Ice Test , 24 June 1976.
40. —-
—
, The Future Arctic Marine Transportation System
,




41. , Office of Research and Development, Projected
Commercial Marine Activity in the Western Arctic , by
J. P. Welsh, Ocotber 1977.
42. , Office of Operations, Plans and Programs Staff,
Projected U. S. Coast Guard Icebreakinq and Icebreaker
Requirements 1975-2000 , by Lieutenant Commander Robert
L. Armacost, February 1975.
43. , Office of Research and Development, A Study of
the Behavior of Oil Spills in the Arctic , by Lieutenant
( j . g.) John L. Glaeser and Lieutenant Commander George
P. Vance, February 1971.
44. Dome Petroleum, Energy from the Arctic in the 80's ,
undated, Calgary, Alberta.
45. , Proposal to the U. S. Government for Participa-
tion in the Research Program with the CANMAR KIGORIAK
An Arctic Class IV Icebreaker , December 1979.
46. , Research Program for the Kigoriak, An
Experimental Arctic Class IV Icebreaker , October 1979.
47. Department of Energy, Secretary's Annual Report to
Congress , January 1980.
48. Energy Resources Company, Inc., and E. G. Frankel, Inc.,
Study to Assess the Impact of Alaskan Petroleum
Development on the Coast Guard through the Year 2000
(Final Report for Task 10—Study Summary), January 1980.
49. U. S. Geological Survey, Geological Estimates of Undis-
covered Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources in the United
States , Geological Survey Circular 725, by Betty Miller
and others, 1975.
50. , Resource Report for Proposed PCS Lease Sale 57:
Norton Basin, Alaska , Open File Report 79-720, by M. A.
Fisher and others, April 1979.
51. , U. S. Geological Survey Yearbook, Fiscal Year
1978 .




53. Hibler, W. D. Ill, Statistical Variations in Arctic
Sea Ice Ridging and Deformation Rates , Paper presented
at the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers
Ice Technology Symposium, April 9-11, 1975, Montreal.
54. Lewis Research Center, Air-Cushion Tankers for Alaskan
North Slope Oil , March 1973.
55. , Northwest Passage - Trade Route for Large Air-
Cushion Vehicles , March 1973.
56. Maritime Administration, The Annual Report of the
Maritime Administration for Fiscal Year 1979 , July 1980.
57. , Arctic Marine Transportation R&D Program Action
Plan (Working Paper), by Dr. Zelvin Levine, June 20,
1980.
58. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Oil in the Arctic
(Final Report), by Hoult, Wolfe, O'Dea, and Paturean,
March 1975.
59. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Alaska Field Operations Center,
Alaskans Mineral Potential—1978 .
60. Mitre Corp., A Review of Environmental Issues of the
Transportation of Alaskan North Slope Crude Oil
,
May 197 7.
61. U. S. Navy, Fleet Weather Facility Suitland, Maryland,
A Practical Method of Long Range Ice Forecasting for
the North Coast of Alaska (Part I) , by Don G. Barnett,
March 1976.
62. ORI , Development of a Hazard Strategy for Marine
Operations in Western Alaska and the Western Arctic
,
September 1979.
63. Pacific Northwest Labs (Batelle Memorial Institute),
Geographical Analysis of Oil Spill Potential Assoc-
iated with Alaskan Oil Production and Transportation
Systems , February 1974.
64. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company, Bering-Norton
Petroleum Development Scenarios: Transportation
Systems Analysis , March 1980.
65. Petro-Canada and the Alberta Gas Trunk Line Company,
Arctic Pilot Project. Vol. 1, Application to the
National Energy Board , January 1979.
177

66. , Arctic Pilot Project: What We Are Saying in Our
Application February 1979.
67. Porter, Thomas J., Economic Analysis of an Arctic Ice-
breaking Tanker Transportation System: Nuclear vs.
Fossil , Paper in nuclear engineering, Pennsysvania State
University Graduate School, Department of Nuclear
Engineering, November 1977.
68. Project Independence Blueprint—Final Task Force Report ,
November 1974
69. Rand Corporation, Territorial Waters in the Arctic: The
July 1972. Soviet Position, by S. M. Olenicoff,
70. Sollie, Finn, Arctic Development and Its International
Relevance , Paper presented at the International
Symposium on the Sea, October 16-20, 1978, Tokyo.
71. Systems Research Corporation, Naval Ship Surface
Missions, Vol. II, Arctic Resources , by L. C. Van Allen,
D. M. Tyree and G. S. Sexton, December 1970.
72. Office of Technology Assessment, U. S. Congress, Oil
Transportation by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine
Pollution and Safety Measures , July 1975.
73. Tetra-Tech, Phase II - A Feasibility Study, Port of Nome
Alaska , June 1980.
74. Thermo-Dynamics , Inc., Frozen Fill Arctic Platforms (A
Summary Report on Preliminary Design Studies) , July
1970.
PERIODICALS AND JOURNALS
75. Brewer, Max C, "Land Commitments in Alaska," Arctic ,
v. 28, December 1975.
76. Brooks, David B. , "Beaufort Sea Oil: The costs of
production," Northern Perspectives , v. VIII, 1980.
77. Cadigan, Captain J. J., "The Navy-Coast Guard Mesh In
Future War," U. S. Coast Guard Academy Alumni Bulletin ,
v. 42, November/December 1980.
178

78. Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, "Beaufort Sea Oil:
the Tanker Option," Arctic Seas Bulletin , v. 2, April
1980.
79. , "Black Gold: The Beaufort Oil Rush," Northern
Perspectives , v. VIII, 1980.
80. , "Canadian Sovereignty Over Arctic Waters,"
Arctic Seas Bulletin , v. 2, February 1980.
81. , "Lancaster Sound: Issues and Responsibilities,"
Arctic Seas Bulletin , v. 2, June 1980.
82. , "Scientific and Technological Research Relevant
to the Development of Marine Transportation in the
Canadian North," Arctic Seas Bulletin , v. 2, March 1980.
83. Cohen, Paul, "Cargo Submarines for Naval and Merchant
Use," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , August 1980.
84. Descheneau, Timothy E. , "The New Central Front," U. S.
Naval Institute Proceedings , September 1977,
85. Ekelund, M. J. and Masterson, D. M. , "Floating Platforms
for Oil Exploration in the Arctic Islands," Arctic , v.
33, March 1980.
86. Forbes , "Faces Behind the Figures—Staying put,"
December 8, 1980.
87. , "The Streetwalker—a Dome run," December 8, 1980.
88. , "The wild, wild West," November 24, 1980.
89. Hibler, W. D. Ill, "A Dynamic Thermodynamic Sea Ice
Model," Journal of Physical Oceanography , July 1979.
90. Homan, Menno T. , "The Arctic Pilot Project," Canadian
Arctic Resources Committee, Arctic Seas Bulletin
,
January 1980.
91. Liddle L. F. and Burrell, W. N. , "Problems in the
Design of a Marine Transportation System for the
Arctic," Arctic , v. 28, September 1975.
92. Lotz, Jim, "Northern Pipelines and Southern
Assumptions," Arctic , v. 30, December 1977.
93. Mackay, Donald, "Oil in the Beaufort and Mediterranean
Seas," Arctic , v. 30, June 1977.
179

94. McBride, Stewart, "The Battle of Alaska: Who Owns the
49th State?" Atlantic , May 1979.
95. Miles, P. and Wright, J. R. , "An Outline of Mineral
Extraction in the Arctic," Polar Record , v. 19, January
1978.
96. Mohl, Bertel, "Marine Mammals and Noise," Canadian
Arctic Resources Committee, Arctic Seas Bulletin ,
August 1980.
97. New York Times , "Compromise Bill to Preserve Alaskan
Lands Approved," November 13, 1980.
98. Oil and Gas Journal , "Alaska gas line gets U. S. right
of way," v. 78, December 8, 1980.
99. , "Alaska: Will it ever live up to its potential?"
v. 78, December 8, 1980.
100. :-, "Alaskan built rig to work in Prudhoe Bay area,"
v. 78, October 6, 1980.
101.
, "Aleyeska now moving peak Prudhoe flow," v. 78,
February 25, 1980.
102. , "Andrus: Range in Alaska is no target," v. 78,
July 21, 1980.
103.
, "Canada's 1990's imports independence seen slim,"
v. 78, September 15, 1980.
104.
, "Canada pushes for Alaska gas line," v. 78,
November 10, 1980.
105.
, "Canada's Beaufort, Arctic Islands, Atlantic
frontiers look steadily better," v. 78, February 25,
1980.
106.
, "Canadian ownership key energy policy theme,"
v. 78, September 29, 1980.
107.
, "Canadian policy takes further industry toll,"
v. 78, December 29, 1980.
108.
, "Dome chief: Beaufort to supply half of Canada's




, "Exxon scores oil finds near new Beaufort
leases," v. 78, October 13, 1980.
110. , "GAO: Don't pin energy hopes on Alaska, Canada,
Mexico," v. 78, September 1980.
111. , "House approves Senate's Alaskan lands bill,"
v. 78, November 17, 1980.
112.
, "House gets Senate Alaskan lands bill," v. 78,
August 25, 1980.
113.
, "Interior cuts oil, gas estimates in Alaskan
NPR," v. 78, July 28, 1980.
114.
, "New Canadian energy policy draws fire," v. 78,
November 3, 1980.
115. , "Newsletter," v. 78, July 28, 1980.
116. , "Newsletter," v. 78, August 25, 1980.
117. , "Newsletter," v. 78, September 15, 1980.
118. , "Newsletter," v. 78, October 13, 1980.
119. , "Newsletter," v. 78, October 20, 1980.
120. , "Newsletter," v. 78, November 10, 1980.
121. , "Newsletter," v. 78, December 8, 1980.
122. , "Newsletter," v. 78, December 15, 1980.
123. , "Newsletter," v. 78, December 29, 1980.
124.
,
"Newsletter," v. 79, January 5, 1981.
125.
, "No colossal new oil field in Siberia," v. 78,
December 15, 1980.
126.
, "Operators poised for Beaufort drilling," v. 78,
February 25, 1980.
127.
, "Parsons gets Prudhoe gas plant contract," v. 78,
October 13, 1980.
128. , "Premium of $2.57 offered for Alaska royalty




, "Producer participation seen in Alaskan gas
line," August 11, "1980.
130. , "Prudhoe Bay operators lay plans for mammoth
seawater injection project," v. 78, February 25, 1980.
131. , "Prudhoe waterflood timetable revealed," v. 78,
October 6, 1980.
132.
, "SOHIO spuds Alaskan Beaufort Sea well," v. 78
November 17, 1980.
133. , "Soviet oil decline likely despite surge in
drilling," v. 78, 1980.
134.
, "Soviets due first of three arctic drillships
in 1981," v. 78, July 28, 1980.
135.
, "Trans-Alaska adds pumping facilities," v. 78,
December 8, 1980.
136.
, "Trans-Canada studies Arctic LNG project," v.
78, October 20, 1980.
137. , "US demand for product seen falling again," v.
78, October 27, 1980.
138. , "World oil flows slumps, reserves up," v. 78,
December 29, 1980.
139. Pharand, Donat, "Canada's Jurisdiction Over the
Northwest Pasage," Canadian Arctic Resources Commit-
tee, Arctic Seas Bulletin , October 1980.
140. Polar Record , "Canada's Northernmost Mine," v. 20,
May 1980.
141.
, "Completion of the Icebreaking Cargo Ship MV
ARCTIC," v. 19, September 1978.
142.
, "The Northern Sea Route, 1978" v. 19, May 1979.
143. , "The Northern Sea Route, 1979," v. 20, May
1980.
144.
, "Panarctic Oils Ltd, 1977-78," v. 19, January
1979.
145.





, "Soviet Merchant Ships Cleared for Sailing on the
Northern Sea Route, 1977," v. 19, May 1979.
147. Pullen, T. C, "The Development of Arctic Ships,"
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Arctic Seas
Bulletin , September 1980.
148. San Francisco Sunday Chronicle and Examiner , "The new
senators: younger, greener and more conservative,"
January 4, 1981.
149. Scheina, Robert L. , "Coast Guard Compendium," U. S.
Naval Institute Proceedings , October 1980.
150. Shoemaker, Lieutenant Commander Brian H. , "Ships of
Ice," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , February 1976.
151. Smith, Lee, "Dome on Top of the World," Fortune , August
11, 1980.
152. Sumner, N. Ray Jr. and Manners, Raymond D. , "Arctic
Surface Effect Vehicles," Arctic Bulletin , v. 2, no. 7,
1975.
153. Taagholt, Jorgen, "Arctic Resources," Arctic Bulletin ,
v. 2, no. 14, 1978.
154. Thompson, Rear Admiral Donald C, "Renewing the Physical
Plant," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , October 1980.
155. Wadhams, Peter, "Oil and Ice in the Beaufort Sea,"
Polar Record , v. 18, no. 114, 1976.
156. Wall Street Journal , "Dome Petroleum Plans $250 Million
Outlay For Shipyard," December 18, 1980.
157. , "Nationalism in Ottawa Perils U. S. Investment in
Energy, Other Areas," February 18, 1981.
158. Weller, Gunter, "Outer Continental Shelf Environmental
Assessment Program in the Beaufort Sea," Arctic
Bulletin, v. 2, no. 9, 1976.
MISCELLANEOUS
159. U. S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction 16151.1,




160. , "Fiscal Year 81 Budget Estimates," (as
submitted) , undated.
161.
, Commander (dpi), Seventeenth Coast Guard
District letter 5000, Subject: Icebreaking Services
in Alaska, 20 February 1979.
162. , Issue Paper for Chief, Office of Operations
meeting with Interagency Arctic Policy Group, Subject:
Arctic Development, 4 December 1980.
163. , Office of Operations, "Mission Needs Statement
for Development of CG Domestic Marine Transportation
Assistance Capability along Alaska's North Slope,"
undated.
164. , Commandant (G-OMI) Memorandum 16153.1, From
Chief, Office of Operations to Office of Assistant
Secretary for Policy and International Affairs
(Department of Transportation), 4 December 1980.
165.
, Commandant (G-OMI) Memorandum 16153.1, From
Chief, Marine Science and Icebreaking Division to Chief,
Office of Operations, 20 August 1980.
166. , Commandant (G-OMI) Letter 5010, Subject: Program
Intentions in Alaska, 24 August 1979.
167. , Office of Operations, Marine Science and
Icebreaking Division, interviews and discussions with
Captain R. R. Garrett, Commander R. E. Hammond, and
Lieutenant G. A. Capacci, September 1980-March 1981.
168. Levine, Dr. Zelvin, Office of Advanced Ship Development,
Maritime Administration, telephone interview on 12
January 1981.
169. Luhrs, Larry, Office of Oil and Gas, Department of
Energy, telephone interview on 16 December 1980.
170. Memorandum of Agreement Between the U. S. Coast Guard
and Department of Defense For Coast Guard Icebreaker
Support, signed in May/June 1979.
171. Memorandum of Agreement Between the U. S. Coast Guard
and the National Science Foundation For Coast Guard
Icebreaker Support, Signed September 1979.
184

172. Putzke, Captain Stanley G., Crowley Maritime Inc.,
telephone interview on 19 February 1981.
173. Revised Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department
of the Navy and the Department of the Treasury on the
Operation of Icebreakers, signed in June/July 1965.
174. Tennyson, Ed, Offshore Operations Branch, Bureau of Land
Management, telephone interview on 21 January 1981.
175. Wadhams, Dr. Peter, Department of Oceanography, U. S.






1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Commandant (G-OMI) 3
U. S. Coast Guard
Washington, D. C. 20593
4. Commandant (G-PTE) 2
U. S. Coast Guard
Washington, D. C. 20593
5. Lieutenant Jeffrey M. Garrett 10
3525 Terrace Drive
Annandale, Virginia 22003
6. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 1
U. S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801
7. Professor Roger D. Evered 2
Department of Administrative Sciences, Code 54Ev
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
8. Professor Peter Wadhams 1
Department of Oceanography, Code 68Wb
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
9. Professor Kenneth J. Euske 1
Department of Administrative Sciences, Code 54Ee
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. Dr. Carl Jones 1






11. Professor Robert H. Bourke
































Arctic Alaska and icebreaking
3 2768 002 01066 2
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
